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PHYSICIANS, FIREARMS & FREE EXPRESSION:
RECONCILING FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY
WITH DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS REGARDING
THE RIGHT TO POSE QUESTIONS TO
PATIENTS

CLAY CALVERT,* DANIEL AXELROD,* JUSTIN B. HAYES* & MINCH
MINCHIN*

ABSTRACT

This Article analyzes, from both a doctrinal and theoretical
perspective, the First Amendment speech interests now at stake before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in
Wollschlaeger v. Farmer. The case pivots on Flonida's Firearm Owners'
Privacy Act, 2 a statute supported by the National Rifle Association 3 that
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limits the ability of physicians to pose questions to patients regarding
gun ownership. More importantly, the Article addresses a question left
unresolved by the United States Supreme Court since its 1992 abortion
opinion in PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey4
what standard of judicial scrutiny should be applied to measure the
validity of statutes affecting the speech of doctors within the context of
the doctor-patient relationship?
INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no recent event better illustrates the grave danger posed
to young children by firearms than the December 2012 tragedy at Sandy
Hook Elementary School, in which a young man carrying pistols and a
semiautomatic rifle shot and killed twenty minors.5 The incident sparked
a vigorous national debate about gun control.6 As a New York Times
story pointed out, "[t]he reactions were considerably more broad-based
than what had followed previous mass shootings, coming from
Republicans as well as Democrats, from gun control advocates and those
who have favored gun rights in the past, and even from the corporate and

3. See Carl Hiaasen, Florida Loses Another Ridiculous Legal Battle, MIAMI
HERALD (July 7, 2012), http://www.kansas.com/2012/07/11/2403313/carl-hiaasenflorida-loses-another.html.
4. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
5. See generally James Barron, Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in
Connecticut; 28 Dead, Including Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at Al
(providing an initial account of the shootings).
6. See Jennifer Steinhauer & Charlie Savage, Pro-Gun Democrats Signaling
Openness to Limits; Town Starts the Mournful Task ofSaying Goodbye, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2012, at Al (reporting that in the immediate aftermath of the shootings in a
Connecticut elementary school, "many pro-gun Congressional Democrats including Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the majority leader and a longstanding gun
rights supporter - signaled an openness . .. to new restrictions on guns," and adding
that "many Democrats, including several from conservative states, said Congress
should take up the issue next year").
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retail worlds." Indeed, President Barack Obama soon promised to make
gun control a central issue of his second term.8
Measured in hindsight against the horrendous yardstick of a
child-killing tragedy, the effort by Florida in 2011, via House Bill 155,9
to make it more difficult for physicians to question patients about
firearms seems almost nonsensical.o In particular, Section 790.338 of
the Florida Statutes, which was drafted by the National Rifle Association
("NRA")" and signed into law as the Firearm Owners' Privacy Act by
Republican Gov. Rick Scott on June 2, 2011,12 has been derisively
dubbed the "Does vs. Glocks"' 3 law.

7. Adam Nagourney, States' Leaders Proposing Steps to Control Guns, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2012, at Al.

8. Michael D. Shear, Obama Vows FastAction Pressingfor Gun Control, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2012, at Al.
9. See H.B. 155, 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011). The complete legislative
history, including all versions of the bill cited here, is available on the Florida House
of Representatives
website at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills
/billsdetail.aspx?Billld=44993&.
10. It seems nonsensical to prevent physicians from asking about firearm
ownership because, among other things, data suggest "that more than 75% of
unintentional firearm injuries and deaths to children ages 16 and under happen in the
home" and that "up to 50% of parents owning guns keep them loaded and
unlocked." Marjorie S. Hardy, Keeping Children Safe Around Guns: Pitfalls and
Promises, 11 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 352, 353 (2006).
11. See Hiaasen, supra note 3 (reporting that the law was "[w]ritten by the
National Rifle Association" and asserting that the NRA "had no trouble finding a
stooge in the Legislature to sponsor a bill that effectively prohibited physicians from
raising the subject"). The NRA has lobbied unsuccessfully for similar legislation to
be passed in Alabama, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee and West
Virginia. Andy Kroll, After Newtown, Will NRA Still Demand a Ban on Docs Asking
Kids About Guns?, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 20, 2012,
11:10 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/12/nra-docs-glocks-newtown-gun-control.
12. See Marc Caputo, Judge Blocks Fla. Law Restricting Doctor Gun Talk,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/judgeblocks-florida-law-restricting-doctor-gun-talk/ 1191547 (reporting that Scott "signed
the Firearm Owners' Privacy Act into law June 2nd").
13. See Editorial,Doctor Gag Law Indefensible, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.),
Sept. 16, 2011, at 14A (noting that "[t]he law, nicknamed 'Does vs. Glocks,'
infringes upon the free speech rights of doctors and patients, and it interferes with
the doctor-patient relationship").
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The law provides, in relevant part, that health care practitioners
in the Sunshine State shall respect a patient's right to privacy and should
refrain from making a written inquiry or asking questions concerning the
ownership of a firearm or ammunition by the patient or by a family
member of the patient, or the presence of a firearm in a private home or
other domicile of the patient or a family member of the patient.14
The law buttresses this notion of doctors not asking about gun
ownership by adding that physicians "should refrain from unnecessarily
harassing a patient about firearm ownership during an examination." 5
The statute provides that if a patient is asked about firearms, he or she
may refuse to answer such queries.'
The Florida law directly conflicts with the official advice provided to
pediatricians by the American Academy of Pediatrics in 2012:
Pediatricians and other child health care
professionals are urged to counsel parents about the
dangers of allowing children and adolescents to
have access to guns inside and outside the home.
The AAP recommends
that pediatricians
incorporate questions about the presence and
availability of firearms into their patient history

14. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.338(2) (West 2013) (effective June 2, 2011)
(emphasis added). The law allows a physician to ask about firearms only if he or she
"in good faith believes that this information is relevant to the patient's medical care
or safety, or the safety of others." Id. As addressed later in Part I, the law fails to
define the term "relevant." See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
15. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.338(6).
16. Inparticular, the statute states:
A patient may decline to answer or provide any

information regarding ownership of a firearm by the
patient or a family member of the patient, or the

presence of a firearm in the domicile of the patient or a
family member of the patient. A patient's decision not to

answer a question relating to the presence or ownership
of a firearm does not alter existing law regarding a
physician's authorization to choose his or her patients.
Id. at § 790.338(4).
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taking and urge parents who possess guns to
prevent access to these guns by children.17
Such a stance seems like common sense, given that "[fjirearm
injuries are a major health risk of children in the United States, especially
for those living in states with a high level of gun ownership."' 8 It thus
should be anything but surprising that the Florida statute sparked a fierce
First Amendment-based free speech' 9 challenge filed on behalf of several
Florida physicians and physician interest groups in Wollschlaeger v.
Farmer.2 0 "This gun lobby-backed gag law is a clear violation of the
First Amendment rights of doctors and patients to discuss the severe
risks posed by guns in the home, particularly to children," asserted Paul
Helmke, president of the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, in
announcing the lawsuit supported by his organization. 2 1
In June 2012, United States District Court Judge Marcia G.
Cooke issued a permanent injunction preventing Florida from enforcing
the law, 22 concluding that the law amounted to a content-based restriction

17. American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Firearm-Related
InjuriesAffecting the PediatricPopulation, 130 PEDIATRICS 1416, 1421 (2012).
18. Carolin Senger et al., PediatricFirearmInjuries: A 10-Year Single-Center
Experience of 194 Patients, 46 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 927, 927 (2011).) (citing
Matthew Miller et al., Firearm Availability and Unintentional Firearm Deaths,
Suicide, andHomicide Among 5-14 Year Olds, 52 J.TRAUMA 267 (2002)).
19. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press
Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety years ago through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local
government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925). ("[F]reedom of speech and of the press - which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress - are among the fundamental personal
rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States.").
20. 800 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
21. Press Release, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Brady Center,
Ropes & Gray Filing Suit on Behalf of Doctors to Strike Down Florida Gun Law
Limiting Free Speech (June 6, 2011), available at http://qa.bradycampaign.org
/media/press/view/1396/.
22. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
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on speech2 3 that "aims to restrict a practitioner's ability to provide
truthful, non-misleading information to a patient (or record such
information), whether relevant or not at the time of the consult with the
patient."24 The permanent injunction followed a preliminary one issued
by Judge Cooke in September 2011.25
The issuance of a permanent injunction, however, did not end the
matter, as Governor Scott quickly announced he would appeal Judge
Cooke's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
26
Circuit. As Miami Herald columnist Fred Grimm wrote shortly after
the elementary school shooting in Connecticut, 27 "the state, with Gov.
Rick Scott's blessing, with your tax dollars, has taken the fight to a
federal appeals court, trying to get the gag law reinstated." 2 8 Conversely,
Governor Scott asserted the "law was carefully crafted to respect the
First Amendment while ensuring a patient's constitutional right to own
or possess a firearm without discrimination. I signed this legislation into
law because I believe it is constitutional and I will continue to defend
it."29

This Article examines the First Amendment interests at stake in
the ongoing litigation in Wollschlaeger, including both the right to speak
and the unenumerated right to receive speech. 30 Indeed, the complaint in

23. Id. at 1261. As Judge Cooke opined, "the law places restrictions on only
one subject matter - firearm ownership." Id.
24. Id. at 1263.
25. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
26. See Editorial, Stop Fighting 'Gun Gag Law': Florida Should Not Waste
Additional Legal Fees in Supporting an Unnecessary Law, STUART NEWS (Fla.),
Nov. 23, 2012, at 10 (asserting that "[a]fter the judge's ruling, Florida's governor
announced that the state would appeal it with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit").
27. See Barron, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
28. Fred Grimm, Gun Advocates Just Change the Subject, MIAMI HERALD
(Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/12/17/3146597/gun-advocates-

just-change-the.html.
29. Press Release, Rick Scott: 45th Governor of Florida, Florida Appeals
Federal
Court
Decision
(July
30,
2012),
available
at
http://www.flgov.com/2012/07/30/florida-to-appeal-federal-court-decision/.
30. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1971) (addressing the
First Amendment right to receive information); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965) (observing that "the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the
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Wollschlaeger asserts both rights, including the right of Florida health
care practitioners "to engage in open and free exchanges of information
and advice with their patients about ways to reduce the safety risks posed
by firearms," ' and "the First Amendment rights of patients throughout
Florida to receive such information and advice from their physicians."32
Going beyond the First Amendment doctrinal issues to the realm of free
speech theory from which those doctrine spring, this Article explores
how traditional theories of free expression bolster the need for the
Eleventh Circuit to uphold Judge Cooke's rulings enjoining the Firearm
Owners' Privacy Act.
Part I of the Article provides an overview of the legislative
history behind the Firearm Owners' Privacy Act, illustrating how
anecdotal incidents can spawn a piece of legislation framed by its
supporters as a pro-Second Amendment 34 measure rather than an antiFirst Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of
freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the
right to distribute, the right to receive, [and] the right to read" (emphasis added);));
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (asserting that the First Amendment
"freedom embraces the right to distribute literature and necessarilyprotects the right
to receive it" (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted); ACLU v. Alvarez, 679
F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing the "derivative" right to receive speech and
calling it "well established"); see also Paula E. Berg, Lost in a Doctrinal Wasteland:
The Exceptionalism of Doctor-PatientSpeech Within the Rehnquist Court's First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 153, 174 (1998) (observing that "the
First Amendment protects both positive and negative speech rights - the right to
speak, the right not to speak, the right to receive ideas by listening to others, and the
right not to be compelled to listen to unwanted speech") (emphasis omitted).
31. Complaint at 2, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla.
2012) (No. 1:11 -cv-22026), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/florida/flsdce/ 1:2011 cv22026/380612/1/.

32. Id.
33. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153,
153 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (asserting that "First
Amendment doctrine veers between theory and the exigencies of specific cases. The
function of doctrine is both to implement the objectives attributed by theory to the
Constitution and to offer principled grounds of justification for particular
decisions").
34. See U.S. CONsT. amend. 11 (providing that "[a] well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed").
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First Amendment bill.35 The Second Amendment, as the Supreme Court
recently observed, "elevates above all other interests the right of lawabiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
,,36
home.
Part II then analyzes both Judge Cooke's decision to grant a
permanent injunction in Wollschlaeger and the arguments now being
made by both sides on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.
Part III deploys traditional First Amendment theories to explore
the free speech interests at stake when it comes to questions and
discussions regarding firearms in the doctor-patient setting. This Part
attempts to begin to break new ground because previous academic
scholarship and judicial decisions examining the First Amendment
interests in the doctor-patient relationship have been overwhelmingly
confined to state-imposed restrictions on the subjects of contraception
and abortion.3 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court's seminal privacy ruling in
Griswold v. Connecticut3 articulated a right of patients-specifically,
married couples-to receive speech in the context of a state law limiting
39
the discussion of contraception. In contrast, Wollschlaeger does not
involve speech about any course of medical treatment, medical
procedure, or even the prescription of medications. Rather, the case
hinges squarely on the First Amendment right of doctors to ask questions
to learn about possible threats to the physical safety of children that may
be present in private residences.40
35. See Gayland 0. Hethcoat II, In the Crosshairs:Legislative Restrictions on
Patient-PhysicianSpeech About Firearms, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 10
(2011) (asserting that "supporters and opponents of the Florida firearm statute have
used the Second and First Amendments, respectively, to frame the law").
36. District of Columbia v. Heller et al., 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
37. See Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient
Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201,
202 (1994) (writing that "[i]n the United States, ideology-based restrictions on
doctor-patient speech have thus far been limited to discussions about abortion and
contraception").
38. 381 U.S. 479 (1964).
39. Id. at 482 (holding that "[t]he right of freedom of speech and press includes
not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive,
the right to read") (emphasis added).
40. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, a LexisNexis search of both federal and
state case law reveals that only once has any court ever used the phrase "First
Amendment right to ask questions," and that occurred in the context of a citizen
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More significantly, Part III uses First Amendment theory to
argue that restrictions imposed on physicians' right to ask questions of
patients warrants use of the rigorous strict scrutiny standard of judicial
review to which content-based laws typically are subjected. 4 1 This stands
in stark contrast to the Supreme Court's decision twenty-one years ago in
42
PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. There, the
Court held that while physicians do possess First Amendment speech

rights-in Casey, a right not to speak43-those rights come only "as part
of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State.""
The Supreme Court in Casey provided no further elaboration of
the First Amendment speech rights of physicians. As the Second Circuit
observed in 2010, the high court in Casey "dispensed with the doctors'
First Amendment argument summarily, offering only the terse
observation" that those rights are subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation. 4 5 Indeed, as Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs writes, "[f]ower
courts have uniformly interpreted Casey to apply a 'reasonable
posing questions to police officers. See Bahnson v. Office Pima Cnty. Sheriff, No.
93-17332, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 12708, at *4, n.1 (9th Cir. May 24, 1995).
41. See Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011)
(observing that "a restriction on the content of protected speech" requires a
governmental entity to "demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny" such that the
regulation "is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to
serve that interest"); United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 163 (2d Cir. 2012)
(observing that "[cjontent-based speech restrictions are subject to 'strict scrutiny' that is, the government must show that the regulation at issue is narrowly tailored to
serve or promote a compelling government interest"); Dex Media W., Inc. v. City of
Seattle, 696 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2012) (opining that "[w]e evaluate content-based
restrictions on noncommercial speech under strict scrutiny"); see also Aziz Z. Huq,
Preserving Political Speech From Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 16, 16 (2012) (noting that strict scrutiny, although "internally variegated"
as applied by courts, purports to require that laws serve compelling government
interests and are narrowly tailored to serve them).
42. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
43. See id. at 884 (writing that "[a]Il that is left of petitioners' argument is an
asserted First Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about the
risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To be sure, the
physician's FirstAmendment rights not to speak are implicated")(emphasis added).
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Conn. Bar Ass'n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 98 n.18 (2d Cir. 2010).
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relationship' test to claims by abortion providers that disclosure
requirements violate their free speech rights." 4 6 Even more troubling, as
Professor Christina Wells points out, it is quite possible to read the Casey
opinion as denying any First Amendment speech interest, as she
contends that:
The joint opinion's real flaw came in its cavalier
dismissal of petitioners' free speech argument
because it did not consider abortion counseling to
be a form of speech. In fact, the opinion gives one
the impression that abortion counseling is so
obviously a form of activity rather than speech that
it is not even worth discussing at length. 4 '
Indeed, Judge Cooke in Wollschlaeger acknowledged in her June
2012 opinion issuing a permanent injunction preventing enforcement of
the Firearm Owners' Privacy Act that the question of "which
constitutional standard should be applied in professional speech cases is
still an unsettled question of law."4 8 Although she applied the strict
scrutiny standard of review in 2011 at the preliminary-injunction phase,49
she dodged the issue in 2012 of whether strict scrutiny or a less
demanding test should apply: "I need not decide which standard applies
because the State would not prevail under either test."5 0
The bottom line is that Wollschlaeger provides a propitious
opportunity to use First Amendment theory to help resolve this issue and
to argue that the strict scrutiny doctrine is the more applicable test in
cases involving pure speech that takes the form of questions posed to
patients designed to protect children from harm. Concluding at the
crossroads between First Amendment theory and doctrine, Part IV
summarizes and supports this Article's arguments, reviews

46. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About the
Constitutionalityof PersuasiveGovernment Speech on ProductLabels, 87 DENV. U.
L. REV. 855, 888 (2010).
47. Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The FreeSpeech
Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1724, 1738 (1995).
48. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1262-63 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
49. Id. at 1262.
50. Id. at 1263.
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Wollschlaeger's possible ramifications for future case law, and remarks
on how the Eleventh Circuit's decision augurs for other threats to
physicians' fireann-related speech.
I. THE

FIREARM OWNERS' PRIVACY ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, KEY TERMS
AND FRAMING THE DEBATE

A. Legislative History and Key Terms

Behind every new law, it seems, there is a combustible
confluence of characters. A miffed mother," a perturbed pediatrician,52 a
fervent gun-rights organization, and a responsive lawmaker54 comprise
the quartet of key players largely responsible for Florida's Firearm
Owners' Privacy Act.
The clash between the first two of these figures was the initial
impetus for the Act. In July 2010, Amber Ullman contacted her local
legislator to complain about Dr. Chris Okonkwo, a board-certified
pediatrician specializing in comprehensive pediatric care in the rural city
56
of Ocala. One month prior, Okonkwo reportedly told Ullman she
needed to find a new doctor after the young mother refused to answer the

51. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
53. Specifically, the National Rifle Association, which describes itself as
"widely recognized today as a major political force and as America's foremost
defender of Second Amendment rights" and "the premier firearms education
organization in the world." About Us: A Brief History of the NRA, NATIONAL RIFLE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, http://membership.nrahq.org/about-us.asp (last visited
Oct. 30, 2013).
54. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
55. See Jay Weaver, Miami FederalJudge Sides With 'Docs' Over 'Glocks' in
Fla. Gun Rights Case, MIAMI HERALD (July 2, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/
2012/07/02/2879089/miami-federal-judge-sides-with.html.
56. See
Meet
the Doctors, CHILDREN'S
HEALTH
OF OCALA,
http://www.childrenshealthofocala.com/meet-the-doctors.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2013) (providing a brief biography of Dr. Okonkwo).
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pediatrician's question about whether there were firearms in her home.
Ullman did not understand why the query, which she viewed as privacyinvasive, was necessary during a routine checkup of Temperance, her
four-month-old daughter.
According to Slate magazine, Ullman vociferously objected to
Okonkwo's question, telling him, "None of your business!, 5 9 When the
doctor attempted to explain his rationale for posing the question, Ullman
angrily retorted, "Didn't you hear what I said? None of your damn
business!,,60
This was not, however, an isolated incident, at least according to
a brief filed with the Eleventh Circuit in September 2012 by Florida
Attorney General Pamela Bondi. 61 Another lawmaker reported receiving
an email from "a mother who was separated from her children while
medical personnel not only interrogated the children about gun
ownership but put that in their medical record." 6 2 The brief further
described an incident directly involving a Florida legislator.63 In that
case, after inquiring about firearm possession, a doctor advised the
lawmaker to remove a firearm from his home-advice taken by the
legislator as a direct attack on his Second Amendment rights.6 A fourth
incident involved a constituent calling a legislator to report "that a doctor
had refused care upon a nine-year-old . . . that was in their custody ...

because they wanted to know if they had a firearm in their home."65

57. Fred Hiers, Family and PediatricianTangle Over Gun Question, OCALA
STAR-Banner (last updated July 24, 2010, 11:52 AM) http://www.ocala.com/article
/20100724/ARTICLES/7241001.
58. Id.
59. Helena Rho, The Pediatricians vs. the NRA, SLATE (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/healthand-science/medical-examiner/2013/02/pediat
ricians and nraphysiciangag rules andthecdc aca andstates.html.
60. Id.
61. Brief for Appellants at 3-4., Wollschlaeger v. Scott, No. 12-14009-FF
(11th Cir. Sept. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants].
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 3-4.
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These anecdotes, along with the support of the National Rifle
Association,66 provided enough fodder for Jason Brodeur, a freshman
Republican representative from Sanford, Florida, and twelve co-sponsors
to introduce House Bill 155 in January 2011.67 As one columnist for the
Palm Beach Post wrote, the "NRA sprang into action by unleashing its
fully owned subsidiary, the Florida Legislature, to criminalize the
practice of responsible patient care." 6 8 As originally proposed, the bill
provided, in relevant part that:
[a] verbal or written inquiry by a public or private
physician, nurse, or other medical staff person
regarding the ownership of a firearm by a patient or
the family of a patient or the presence of a firearm
in a private home or other domicile of a patient or
the family of a patient violates the privacy of the
patient or the patient's family members,
respectively.69
As introduced, the bill featured extremely severe punishments.
Specifically, it deemed a violation to constitute a third-degree felony and
subjected an offending physician to a fine of up to "$5 million if the
court determines that the person knew or reasonably should have known
that the conduct was unlawful."70
It took slightly more than four months and several amendments
for the bill to move through the Florida Legislature. 7 1 By late April 2011,
the Florida House of Representatives passed the bill by a margin of

66. See Editorial, No Joy in Mudville, TAMPA BAY TIMES, July 8, 2012, at 2P
(noting that the law "was pushed by the National Rifle Association").
67. H.B. 155, 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011).
68. Frank Cerabino, Talk to Me, Doc; Just Don't Ask About My Guns, PALM
BEACH POST, Feb. 24, 2011, at 1B.
69. H.B. 155, 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011) (as introduced Jan. 10, 2011),
available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx
?FileName=-h0155_.docx&DocumentType=Bill&BillNumber-0 1 55&Session=20
11.
70. Id
71. See Doctor Gag Law Indefensible, supra note 13, at 14A (noting that
"As[a]s originally filed by Rep. Jason Brodeur, R-Sanford, and Sen. Greg Evers, RBaker, doctors could be punished for up to five years in prison and a $5 million fine.
Those pernicious elements were removed").
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eighty-eight to thirty, and the next day the Senate approved it by a vote
of twenty-seven to ten.72 In its final form and as now codified as Section
790.338 of the Florida Statutes,73 the measure makes physicians subject
to disciplinary action under state laws regulating health professions.74
The firearms law provides, in key part, that health care practitioners:
shall respect a patient's right to privacy and should
refrain from making a written inquiry or asking
questions concerning the ownership of a firearm or
ammunition by the patient or by a family member
of the patient, or the presence of a firearm in a
private home or other domicile of the patient or a
family member of the patient. Notwithstanding this
provision, a health care practitioner or health care
facility that in good faith believes that this
information is relevant to the patient's medical care
or safety, or the safety of others, may make such a
verbal or written inquiry.
The emphasized words and phrases in the above-quoted portion
of the law illustrate its seemingly contradictory nature. On the one hand,
the word "shall" appears to indicate the mandatory or imperative nature
76
of the law, yet the word "should" in the very same sentence intimates
the law is merely suggestive or hortatory.77 On the other hand, as a recent
law joumal article points out, "there have been many cases where a
72. See Firearm Owners--Health Care Providers--Privacy, 2011 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. Ch. 2011-112 (C.S.C.S.H.B. 155) (West) (codified as Fla. Stat. § 790.338
(2012)).
73. FLA. STAT. § 790.338.

74. Id. at § 456.072.
75. Id. at § 790.338(2) (emphasis added).
76. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 569-70 (1988) (classifying
"shall," as used in a federal statute, as "mandatory language"); see also Julian
Velasco, CongressionalControl Over Federal Court Jurisdiction:A Defense of the
TraditionalView, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671, 697 (1997) (noting that "the word 'shall'
often denotes a mandatory meaning, particularly when used in legislation").
77. See generally Peter D. Webster et al., Statutory Construction in Florida:In
Search of a PrincipledApproach, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 435, 468-70 (2008)
(providing an overview of statutory construction in Florida, and pointing out the
Florida Supreme Court's own disagreement on the meaning of the word "shall" in
the case of State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2002)).
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statutory 'shall' has been held to be directory or precatory or hortatory
rather than mandatory."78
When granting a preliminary injunction thwarting enforcement
of the law in September 2011, Judge Marcia Cooke wrestled with this
issue of statutory construction. 79 She ultimately concluded that "laws that
provide for disciplinary action in the case of violations or noncompliance
and that Florida's
are mandatory, not precatory or hortatory,"
meaningless the
would
render
"interpretation of the law as hortatory
law's provision that violations of the law shall constitute grounds for
disciplinary action."
How did this confusing blend of language end up in the law?
According to the Miami Herald, "[o]riginally, the legislation banned
doctors from asking about firearms at all. But the National Rifle
Association and the Florida Medical Association agreed on compromise
legislation that said doctors 'should' refrain from the line of
questioning."82 The compromise apparently came because "many on the
Senate Health Regulation Committee" felt the original bill "was a
violation of free-speech rights."
78. Tobias A. Dorsey, Sense and Severability, 46 U.
(2012).
79.
80.
8 1.
82.

RICH. L. REv. 877, 902

Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1376-77 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
Id. at 1376.
Id.
Marc Caputo, Judge Blocks Florida Law Restricting Doctor Gun Talk,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 14, 2011, available at NewsBank database, Rec. No.
201109140500KNRIDDERFLMIAMIH 98a42ecc2Oe8daaaad667c5c9870df62. The
Florida Medical Association describes itself as:
a professional association dedicated to the service and
assistance of Doctors of Medicine and Doctors of Osteopathic
Medicine in Florida. The FMA represents more than 20,000
physicians on issues of legislation and regulatory affairs,
medical economics and education, public health, and ethical
and legal issues. We advocate for physicians and their patients
to promote the public health, ensure the highest standards of
medical practice, and to enhance the quality and availability of
health care in the Sunshine State.
FMA4, FLORIDA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.flmedical.org/
the
About
About theFMA.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
83. Marc Caputo, NRA (2nd Amendment) and FMA (1st Amendment) Call a
Truce, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 25, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/
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The second sentence of the above-quoted section 84 further
convolutes matters by permitting questions about firearms, but only if a
physician first possesses a good-faith belief that the information gleaned
from the question would be relevant for safety purposes. The law,
however, fails to articulate what "relevant" means within this context or
how a physician is to formulate such a good-faith belief.86 This goodfaith relevance exception was still not able to save the bill from
enjoinment.87
A separate provision of the statute also mixes mandatory and
hortatory terminology affecting a physician's freedom of speech. In
particular, Section 6 provides that physicians "shall respect a patient's
legal right to own or possess a firearm and should refrain from
unnecessarily harassing a patient about firearm ownership during an
examination."
Soon after Governor Rick Scott signed the bill into law in June,
2011, a group of medical professionals, led by Miami family health
practitioner Bemd Wollschlaeger, challenged its constitutionality and
sought an injunction. 89 The legal fight over the law's future quickly
became, as the Miami Herald put it, "an ideological battle between
advocates of free speech and the right to bear arms." 9 0 Lead plaintiff
Bernd Wollschlaeger knows firsthand the dangers of censorship and the
importance of being able to speak the truth; his father was a Nazi tank
commander who was awarded a Knight's Cross by Adolf Hitler, and he

blogs/the-buzz-florida-politics/content/nra-2nd-amendment-and-fma- 1stamendment-call-truce.
84. "Notwithstanding this provision, a health care practitioner or health care
facility that in good faith believes that this information is relevant to the patient's

medical care or safety, or the safety of others, may make such a verbal or written
inquiry." FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2) (2013) (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
87. See infra Part IL.A,
88. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(6) (emphasis added).
89. Jay Weaver, Doctors Urge Judge to End Ban on Asking Patients About
Guns, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 14, 2011), available at NewsBank, Rec. No.
1107130150.
90. Weaver, supra note 55.
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told his son that his "teachers were all communists and liars and that a
Holocaust never actually existed." 9 1
The landslide of political momentum that carried the bill through
the legislature was not surprising. Pro-Second Amendment regulation is
92
common in Florida, which sometimes is derisively referred to as the
"Gunshine State." 93 By late 2012, Florida had issued one million active
concealed-carry licenses.94 It is a state where more than thirty percent of
its citizens own guns.9 Okonkwo, in fact, told one newspaper reporter
that more than half of his patients owned guns.96
In recent years, Floridian pro-gun legislation has included
passage of a law obliging employers to allow employees to keep guns in
their vehicles97 while at work, and county governments to allow guns in
public buildings and parks. 9 8 Florida also has lifted the ban on guns in

91. Elaine Markowitz, Raised in a Nazi Family, He Converted to Judaism,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.tampabay.com/news/humaninterest

Bernd Wollschlaeger
/raised-in-a-nazi-family-he-converted-to-judaism/1274963.
later converted to Judaism after discovering the history of his family. Id.
92. See Adam Weinstein, How the NRA and Its Allies Helped Spread a
Radical Gun Law Nationwide, MOTHER JONES (June 7, 2012, 3:10 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/nra-alec-stand-your-ground?page= 1.
93. Michael C. Bender & Simone Baribeau, Florida Turns 'Gunshine State'
After Years of Republican Control, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2012, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-29/florida-turns-gunshine-state-afteryears-of-republican-control.html.
94. Michael Van Sickler, It's Official: Florida Passes I Million Threshold in
Concealed Weapons Permits, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012, 3:45 PM),
http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/the-buzz-florida-politics/content/its-official-floridapasses-I-million-threshold-concealed-weapons-permits; see also Daniel Ruth, Gun
Frenzy Creating a Loaded Situation, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at IPI,
available at General OneFile, Doc. No. A314211824 (asking whether Florida really
wants "to be known as the Gunshine State?," and adding that Florida recently
"reached the 1 million mark in the number of folks running around with concealed
weapons permits. And the state's insane 'stand your ground' law makes it so much
easier and convenient for us to shoot each other over a fender-bender").
95. See Bender & Baribeau, supra note 93 (explaining that Florida, a "state of
about 19 million has about 6 million gun owners").
96. See Hiers, supra note 57.
97. See FLA. STAT. § 790.338 (2012).
98. See Lizette Alvarez, Florida Forces Towns to Pull Local Laws Limiting
Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2011, at 12N.
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national forests and state parks;99 allowed military personnel as young as
seventeen to acquire concealed-weapons licenses;'00 withheld the names
of concealed-carry licensees within public records; and permitted
concealed-carry licensees "to briefly and openly display the firearm to
the ordinary sight of another person.,,to1
It thus seemed natural, if not inevitable, that Florida would pass
its new physicians-and-firearms law in 2011 and, in turn, defend it as a
valuable addition to its formidable body of statutes protecting the Second
Amendment rights of Floridians.1 02 Yet while the "Glocks" side of the
debate presented its arguments in that constitutionally cloaked frame, the
"Docs" were approaching this political matter through an entirely
different constitutional lens. Ultimately, in their attempts to win the
political debate both in the court of law and the court of public opinion,
each side became purposeful with the frames through which it presented
arguments and, in turn, through which the news media filtered them.
Indeed, framing constitutes "a fundamental part of political
communication and news reporting.,,1o3
B. Issue Framing

Framing theory suggests that just as an artist understands how a
physical frame surrounding her work significantly affects viewers'
perceptions of the image within it, so too does the shrewd proponent of
an argument or idea understand that her angles and word choices-the
informational context of her contentions-can be the difference in
success or failure in persuading an audience.10 4 This reality manifests
itself so strongly in some situations that, even when discussing the same

99. See id.
100. See FLA. STAT. § 790.062 (2012).
101. See Weinstein, supra note 92.
102. Toluse Olorunnipa, Pro-Gun Proving Ground, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Apr.
2, 2012, at lA, availableat General OneFile, Doc. No. A285094547.
103. Lene Aaroe, Investigating Frame Strength: The Case of Episodic and
Thematic Frames,28 POL. COMM. 207, 207 (2011).
104. David Tewksbury & Dietram Scheufele, News Framing Theory and
Research, in MEDIA EFFECTS 17, 17 (Jennings Bryant & Mary Beth Oliver eds., 3d.
ed. 2009).
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idea, separate entities can create starkly differing narratives of the same
facts. o

According to Professor Robert Entman, frames perform a trio of
functions: diagnosing, evaluating and prescribing06 -all three are
apparent on both sides of the physicians-and-firearms debate. "Framing
essentially involves selection and salience,",o Entman writes, adding
that "[t]o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make
them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
108 evaluation,
described."
item
the
for
recommendation
treatment
and/or
Ultimately, as Philip Hart notes, framing is "a robust and broad
theoretical approach that has been used in multiple strains of literature,
research, and disciplines."09 Framing seems particularly relevant for an
issue such as the Florida law at the heart of this Article because, as
Professor Entman asserts, "policy making in democratic systems can be
understood as a series of continuing competitive struggles to dominate
the framing of problems and solutions."'"0
The news media's significant attention paid to the Amber
Ullman incident in Ocalai' constitutes what is known as episodic
framing, in which "a story focuses on individuals who illustrate and

105. Wan Hulaimi, Don't Underestimate the Power of Narratives, VETERANS
(Sep.
26,
2011),
http://www.veteranstoday.com/2011/09/26/dontunderestimate-the-power-of-narratives/.
106. Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured
Paradigm,43 J. COMM. 51, 52 (1993).
107. Id. (emphasis omitted).
108. Id. (emphasis omitted). This recently was described by another scholar as
"Entman's oft-cited definition of framing." Lesa Hatley Major & Kimberly K.
Walker, Newspapers Lack Substantive Reporting on Sexual Issues, 31 NEWSPAPER
RES. J. 62, 63 (2010).
109. Philip Solomon Hart, One or Many? The Influence of Episodic and
Thematic Climate Change Frameson Policy Preferences and Individual Behavioral
Change, 33 SCI. COMM. 28, 31 (2011).
110. Carole V. Bell & Robert M. Entman, The Media's Role in America's
ExceptionalPolitics of Inequality: Framingthe Bush Tax Cuts of 2001 and 2003, 16
INT'L J. PRESS/POLITICS 548, 553 (2011).
111. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
TODAY
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exemplify an issue."I12 Episodic framing often thus involves "human
interest stories"1 and "the lives of individuals,"I14 items to which a
verbal skirmish between a young mother and a supposedly nosey doctor
in a rural small town readily lends itself."5 An Orlando Sentinel opinion
column captures well this episodic frame:
The problem came to Floridians' attention in the
summer of 2010 when Amber Ullman took her
baby daughter in to the pediatrician for a checkup.
The doctor followed standard AAP [American
Academy of Pediatrics] policy and asked her
whether she had a gun in her home. When Mrs.
Ullman refused to answer on the grounds of
privacy invasion, the pediatrician terminated the
mother and daughter from his practice. The
pediatrician's abrupt dismissal of the mother and
her baby from his practice touched a nerve. It was
public reaction to inappropriate conduct by a
doctor that prompted the Legislature to pass the
Firearm Owner's Privacy Act.
This column's assertion that a doctor's "inappropriate conduct"
targeting a mother and her "baby daughter" sparked a new law reflects
what Professor Oscar Gandy considers a primary attribute of episodic
themes-namely, an "attempt to demonize individuals . . . as the 'bad
112. Jorg Matthes, FramingResponsibilityfor PoliticalIssues: The Preference
for DispositionalAttributions and the Effects of News Frames, 26 COMM. RES. REP.

82, 83 (2009).
113. Sei-Hill Kim, Talking About Poverty: News Framing of Who is
Responsiblefor Causing and Fixing the Problem, 87 JOURNALISM & MASS. COMM.
Q. 563, 565 (2010).
114. Oscar H. Gandy & Zhan Li, Framing Comparative Risk: A Preliminary
Analysis, 16 HOWARD J.COMM. 71, 72 (2005).
115. For instance, former U.S. Congressman and National Rifle Association
board member Bob Barr directly named Amber Ullman and referenced her clash
with Dr. Okonkwo in a newspaper column castigating what he called "nosey
pediatricians." Bob Barr, Op-Ed., Doctoring Gun Owners' Privacy, ATLANTA J.CONST., May 2, 2011, at A12.
116. Timothy Wheeler, Editorial, Firearm Privacy Act Protects Patients'
Rights, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 17, 2012, at A24, available at America's News,
Record No. 12081760719915.
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guys."" 7 In this instance, a doctor is demonized while a baby and her
mother are victimized.
A July 2010 story in Ullman's hometown newspaper, the Ocala
Star-Banner, also played the episodic-framing card, naming her in the
article's lead sentence: "It was a question Amber Ullman least expected
Wednesday from her children's pediatrician."" 8 The story's final
sentence, book-ending the remark above, intimated that the doctor was,
per Gandy's characterization, the bad guy. Specifically, it quoted Ullman
for the proposition that her "children have to suffer because of this and
that's not right." 19
A news story in the Palm Beach Post about the bill that would
become the Firearm Owners' Privacy Act somewhat sympathetically
described Ullman as a "26-year-old mother of three" and quoted her for
the proposition that her pediatrician asked a "very invasive and personal
question."120 Yet, that same article with this episodic framing also noted
something else-the Florida "legislature is favoring the Second
Amendment right to bear arms over the First Amendment freedom of

speech."'21
This latter claim, unlike the others addressed immediately above,
employs thematic, rather than episodic, framing. Thematic framing
"addresses public issues in more general context" 22 and "emphasize[s]
broader trends and social conditions." 23 Both the stakeholders and the
news media engaged in this type of framing when they cast the
physicians-and-firearms debate as one involving the dueling
constitutional interests of gun rights and speech rights.

117. Gandy & Li, supra note 114, at 72.
118. Hiers, supra note 57.
119. Id.
120. Stacey Singer, Doctors Fear Gun Privacy Law Would Stifle Safety
Questions, PALM BEACH POST (Fla.), Apr. 23, 2011, at 4A., available at America's
News, Record No. 1104233342402.
121. Id.
122. Hsiang Iris Chyi & Maxwell McCombs, Media Salience and the Process
of Framing: Coverage of the Columbine School Shootings, 81 JOURNALISM & MASS
COMM. Q. 22, 24 (2004).
123. Lesa Hatley Major, The Mediating Role of Emotions in the Relationship
Between Frames and Attribution of Responsibility for Health Problems, 88
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 502, 503 (2011).
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For example, a January 2013 New York Times article plays up
the Second Amendment interests while noting that the Florida
physicians-and-firearms law "raised First Amendment questions." 124 A
July 2012 article in the Palm Beach Post quoted the executive director of
the Florida American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") for the
proposition that the Florida law "is about as clear a First Amendment
violation as could be," while also noting that Judge Cooke "ruled [that]
the law in no way affects Second Amendment rights to bear arms but
unconstitutionally violates physicians' First Amendment right to freedom

of speech."1 25
The NRA and its proponents clearly attempted to frame the bill
in Second Amendment terms-or so claimed their opponents, who
garnered valuable opinion-column space in the mainstream news media.
For instance, Thomas Julin, a Florida media defense attorney
representing several friends-of-the-court challenging the law, asserted in
an opinion column in the Sun Sentinel that:
The mere asking of the questions, the NRA argued
in Tallahassee, interfered with the patients'
fundamental Second Amendment right to bear
arms. While this did not make any logical sense,
many state legislators apparently recognized the
opportunity to attract campaign contributions from
one of the nation's most well-funded lobbying
126
organizations.
The practitioners' lobbyl27 framed the issue, as one might expect,
in a free-speech context. Citing First Amendment concerns, the
124. Jane E. Brody, Keeping Children Safe, and Away, From Firearms, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2013, at D7.

125. Dara Kam, Fla. Appeals Gun Law Injunction, PALM BEACH POST (Fla.),
July 31, 2012, at 2A, availableat America's News, Record No. 1207314327241.
126. Thomas R. Julin, Doctors Should Have Right to Ask PatientsAbout Their
Guns, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), July 5, 2012, at I A, available at
America's News, Record No. 12070454526271.
127. It should be noted that not all physicians agree with the stance taken by
plaintiff Bemd Wollschlaeger. Specifically, a group called Doctors for Responsible
Gun Ownership ("DRGO"), which is affiliated with the Second Amendment
Foundation, describes itself as a nationwide network of physicians, scientists,
medical students, and others who support the safe and lawful use of firearms.
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predominant fear mongered-rightly or wrongly so-by opponents of
the law was the law's chilling effect on doctors' speech. According to an
amicus brief filed in November 2012 by a group of physicians and the
American Civil Liberties Union, doctors across Florida allegedly
engaged in self-censorship to avoid potential disciplinary action.128
Further asserting that the statute tramples First Amendment
speech rights, Julin-along with several medical societies and the
ACLU-makes the case that the law would affect the intake
questionnaires commonly used by physicians for the initial screening of
new patients:
These questions are examples of where this statute
has a very real and immediate impact on a
substantial amount of speech by many healthcare
practitioners and providers. The statute subjects
practitioners to discipline if they continue to
engage in the use of their preliminary screening
questionnaires or if they follow up with further oral
.129
questions on the same topic.
The brief filed with the Eleventh Circuit on behalf of Bernd
Wollschlaeger asserts that "[i]nquiring about firearm ownership and
recording such information in a patient's medical record is a routine part
of the effective practice of preventive medicine for many health care
practitioners."' 30 The brief adds that "as part of their practice of

We believe that average Americans, including young
people, can be trusted to use firearms safely for the benefit of
themselves and their communities. You don't need a doctor
lecturing you about guns, especially if he or she has no
knowledge of firearms. And firearm safety is not something
you learn in medical school.
GUN
OWNERSHIP,
FOR
RESPONSIBLE
Information, DOCTORS
DRGO
http://www.drgo.us/?page id=26 (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (emphasis added).
128. Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Affirming the Judgment for
Plaintiffs/Appellees of the ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc. et al. at 9-10,
Wollschlaeger v. Scott, No. 12-14009-FF (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2012) [hereinafter
ACLU Amicus Brief].
129. Id. at 9.
130. Brief for Appellees at 3, Wollschlaeger v. Scott, No. 12-14009-FF (11th
Cir. Oct. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees].

24

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

rvol. 12

preventive medicine, many practitioners, including Appellees, routinely
ask patients about a variety of potential health and safety risks, including
household chemicals, swimming pools, drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and
firearms."' 3 1 In an interview with a local newspaper, Wollschlaeger
further added that "we don't consider ourselves fringe physicians like the
governor likes to say. We are mainstream physicians who want to uphold
safety.... We ask about a lot of things that people may find offensive,
like sexual behavior."l 3 2 NRA lobbyist Marion Hammer rejoined these
contentions by pointing out that swimming pools, chemicals, poison and
sexual behavior are not constitutionally protected, unlike firearm
ownership. 133
Nevertheless, the matter became a First Amendment versus
Second Amendment issue, or, in other words, a matter of censorship
versus discrimination. Indeed, the NRA, in an amicus brief filed with the
Eleventh Circuit, alleges that the Florida law "targets discrimination
against and harassment of individuals who exercise their fundamental
right to keep and bear arms." 34
Of course, the bill's very title-the Firearm Owners' Privacy
Act-makes clear another thematic frame deployed by its supporters:
privacy. As the NRA's Marion Hammer rhetorically asked the American
Medical News in weaving together both the privacy and Second
Amendment frames, "How much is your privacy worth? How much is
your right to keep and bear arms worth?" 35
This all suggests that framing occurred at the levels of both the
news media and the litigants in the case that is this article's centerpiece.
As a September 2011 editorial in the St. Petersburg Times framed the
debate in the first paragraph:
131. Id. at 4.
132. Kristine Crane, Should Doctors Ask PatientsAbout Guns? Forum Airs the
Debate, GAINESVILLE SUN (Fla.), Feb. 6, 2013, at Al, available at
http://www.gainesville.com/article/20130206/ARTICLES/130209725.
133. Id.
134. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc.
Supporting Appellants and Reversal at 4, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., No. 1214009-FF (11th Cir. Oct. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Brief of NRA].
135. Doug Trapp, Physicians, Gun Owners Tangle Over Florida "Don'tAsk"
Gun Bill, AM. MED. NEWS (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.amednews.com/
article/2011013 1/government/301319963/4/.
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Florida's new law punishing doctors for
questioning their patients about firearms is a prime
example of the state's powerful gun lobby
overstepping its bounds. The law, nicknamed
"Does vs. Glocks," infringes upon the free speech
rights of doctors and patients, and it interferes with
the doctor-patient relationship. That didn't stop
lawmakers beholden to the National Rifle
Association from passing the statute in the last
legislative session, or Gov. Rick Scott from signing
it into law.' 36
As the media and litigants framed the issue before the public and
court as a First and Second Amendment battle, the Wollschlaeger court
considered the merits of each side of the debate.
The next Part of this Article examines Judge Cooke's 2012
opinion granting a permanent injunction that stopped enforcement of the
Firearm Owners' Privacy Act. The Part also reviews the arguments made
by the parties and selected friends of the court that are now pending
before the Eleventh Circuit.
II. THE BATTLE IN WOLLSCHLAEGER: FROM THE DISTRICT COURT TO THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

This Part has two sections. Section A analyzes the primary
reasons why Judge Marcia Cooke permanently enjoined the Firearm
Owners' Privacy Act. Section B then delves into the appellate briefs filed
by both parties with the Eleventh Circuit and explores some of the
critical arguments set forth in several amicus briefs filed with that court.

136. Doctor Gag Law Indefensible, supra note 13, at 14A.
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A. The District Court Ruling

1. The Opinion and the Standards Employed by the District Court
In June 2012, Judge Cooke issued a permanent injunction in
Wollschlaeger v. Farmer stopping Florida from enforcing the key
provisions of the Firearm Owners' Privacy Act that would affect the
ability of physicians to ask patients questions about firearm
possession.13 7 This Section reviews Judge Cooke's analysis in reaching
that determination, including her decision not to resolve the crucial
question regarding the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny for laws
.
.
138
restricting physicians' speech.
Addressing the threshold query of whether the plaintiffsphysicians and physician-interest groups-had standing to challenge the
Act, Judge Cooke zeroed in on the crux of their First Amendment
argument. She explained that although the plaintiffs "seriously wish to
ask their patients about firearms and discuss firearm safety with their
patients,"139 they "began self-censoring when the law went into effect in
June 2011. Passage of the law caused Plaintiffs' injury by chilling their

137. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1270. (S.D. Fla. 2012).
Of most significance for this article, she enjoined the provision that states:
A health care practitioner licensed under chapter 456 or
a health care facility licensed under chapter 395 shall
respect a patient's right to privacy and should refrain
from making a written inquiry or asking questions
concerning the ownership of a firearm or ammunition by
the patient or by a family member of the patient, or the
presence of a firearm in a private home or other
domicile of the patient or a family member of the
patient. Notwithstanding this provision, a health care
practitioner or health care facility that in good faith
believes that this information is relevant to the patient's
medical care or safety, or the safety of others, may make
such a verbal or written inquiry.
FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2) (2012).
138. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
139. Id. at 1258.
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speech." 40 Chilling effect arguments are often powerful in First
Amendment jurisprudence,141 and they proved to be so in this case. After
concluding that standing existed because an order stopping enforcement
of the law would permit the plaintiffs to resume asking firearms-related
questions,14 2 Judge Cooke also held the case was ripe for review because
delayed adjudication would cause the plaintiffs to "continue to engage in
self-censorship." 4 3
Next, the court faced the central doctrinal issue: selecting the
correct standard of review for determining whether the Act violated the
plaintiffs' First Amendment speech interests. Here, Judge Cooke initially
had little problem concluding the Act was a content-based regulation,
reasoning that the Act "places restrictions on only one subject matterfirearm ownership." 4 4 This determination of subject matter restriction is
typically important because, as Professor Dan Kozlowski notes, "the
constitutional fate of a regulation under review hinges on the category
[in]to which it has been placed," namely one of the three traditional First
Amendment groupings of content-neutral, content-based, and viewpoint-

based laws.145
Content-based laws are typically subject to the strict scrutiny
standard of judicial review.146 As Judge Cooke wrote in describing this
standard, "[t]o survive strict scrutiny, a law must constitute the least

140. Id. at 1259.
141. See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 333 (2010)
(citing "the substantial, nationwide chilling effect caused" by a federal statute
affecting corporate expenditures as the primary reason for the Court deciding to
exercise "its judicial responsibility" to review the facial validity of that statute); see
also Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the
Online Marketplace ofldeas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 157 (2008) (noting that "[i]n
the United States, courts have been highly conscious of the potential for a chilling
effect," and asserting that "[t]he classic example of a court's concern with chilling
effects" is the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in the defamation case of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
142. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1259.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1261.
145. Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable
Terms Beget Malleable Doctrine, 13 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 131, 131-32 (2008).
146. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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restrictive means of advancing a compelling government interest."l47 She
added that she previously applied strict scrutiny in her September 2011
decision granting a preliminary injunction against the Act.14 8
Yet, Judge Cooke noted that whether strict scrutiny actually is
the correct rule by which to measure the constitutionality of the Act was
not so obvious. As mentioned earlier, she wrote that "which
constitutional standard should be applied in professional speech cases is
still an unsettled question of law." 4 9 Indeed, Professor Robert Post wrote
in 2007 that there is currently a "complex and difficult relationship
between the First Amendment and the regulation of professional speech
of doctors. The nature of this relationship is unfortunately obscure and
controversial."15 0 It was into these constitutionally choppy waters that
Judge Cooke waded.
She explained that the law conceivably could be analyzed under
the balancing test used in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.'5 1 In Gentile,
the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of a state law preventing
attorneys from engaging in pretrial publicity that might prejudice the
adjudicative process.152 The justices in Gentile fractured badly, with
Justice Anthony Kennedy delivering two parts of the opinion for the
Court,'53 and Chief Justice William Rehnquist writing two other parts of
the Court's opinion.15 4

147. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. She added that she previously
applied strict scrutiny in her September 2011 decision granting a preliminary
injunction against the Act. Id. at 1262; see also Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F.
Supp. 2d 1367, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (opining that "[t]he plain language of the law,
with reference to its legislative history, leads me to conclude that the Firearms
Owners' Privacy Act is content-based. Having so determined, I must analyze
whether the law will likely survive strict scrutiny") (citations omitted).
148. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
149. Id. at 1262-63.

150. Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A FirstAmendment Analysis
of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 944 (2007).
151. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
152. Id. at 1033 (setting forth the relevant part of Nevada Supreme Court Rule
177 at issue in the case).
153. Id. at 1032 (noting that Justice Kennedy "delivered the opinion of the
Court with respect to Parts III and VI").
154. Id. at 1062 (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist "delivered the opinion of
the Court with respect to Parts I and II").
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The Chief Justice, in writing Part II of the opinion for the Court,
observed that "our decisions dealing with a lawyer's right under the First
Amendment to solicit business and advertise, contrary to promulgated
rules of ethics, have not suggested that lawyers are protected by the First
Amendment to the same extent as those engaged in other businesses."155
Rehnquist wrote that the speech of attorneys, at least in the context of
representing clients in pending cases, may be regulated "under a less
demanding standard." 5 6 He added that "[w]hen a state regulation
implicates First Amendment rights, the Court must balance those
interests against the State's legitimate interest in regulating the activity in
question."5
While this opinion may be construed as applying only to attorney
speech, Judge Cooke deployed both Gentile and strict scrutiny because,
as attorney David T. Moldenhauer argues, Gentile serves "as a template
for the regulation of speech by professionals that participate in crucial
public functions."
Like attorneys, doctors are professionals who
engage in a heavily regulated practice,159 and courts have suggested that
restrictions on doctors' speech may be subject to a standard of review
less rigorous than strict scrutiny. Indeed, it is important to note that the
Supreme Court in Casey "refused to apply strict scrutiny to the
physicians' compelled speech claims."lO
Professor Paula Berg argues that the high court's abortionrelated rulings during William Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice "stand
for the troubling proposition that the First Amendment does not prohibit
the federal government from manipulating the content of physician-

155. Id. at 1073 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 1074.
157. Id. at 1075.
158. David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics
and First Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by
Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 843, 887 (2006).
159. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed more than a century ago, "[t]here is
perhaps no profession more properly open to such regulation than that which
embraces the practitioners of medicine." Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176
(1910).
160. Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman's Right to
Know: Ultrasounds,Informed Consent, and the FirstAmendment, 45 CONN. L. REV.
595, 630 (2012).
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patient speech, in both publicly and privately financed settings, in order
to promote a particularideology or to accomplish a policy unrelatedto
patienthealth." This emphasized language is pivotal within the context
of Wollschlaeger because it suggests that limiting doctors' speech in
order to serve ideological goals related to the promotion of Second
Amendment rights-even at the expense of patient health-may be
constitutionally permissible.
What type of standard, then, is the Gentile balancing test, and
how did Judge Cooke apply it in her permanent injunction of Florida's
law? Under Gentile, the Court appeared to apply a more heightened form
of scrutiny than rational basis review. Specifically, Chief Justice
Rehnquist contended that the law in question passed constitutional
muster because it served a "substantial state interest in preventing
prejudice to an adjudicative proceeding" and was "narrowly tailored to
achieve" the state's interest.162 The language used in the Court's opinion
thus resembles that of the intermediate scrutiny test, under which a law is
constitutional if it: "(1) advances a 'substantial' government interest; (2)
does not 'burden substantially more open speech than is necessary' (i.e.,
the statute must be narrowly tailored); and (3) leaves open 'ample
1 63
alternative channels for communication."'
As Professor Brian Freeman explains, if a law dealing with "the
regulation of expressive conduct is unrelated to the suppression of free
speech, intermediate scrutiny will be used and the Court will apply a
balancing test, often upholding the challenged regulation."
Furthermore, Freeman states that intermediate scrutiny "is less

.161. Paula E. Berg, Lost in a Doctrinal Wasteland: The Exceptionalism of
Doctor-Patient Speech Within the Rehnquist Court's First Amendment
Jurisprudence,8 HEALTH MATRIX 153, 158 (1998) (emphasis added).
162. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991).
163. Free Speech Coal. v. United States, 677 F.3d 519, 535 (3d Cir. 2012)

(citations omitted); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (writing that the government may "enforce regulations of the
time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication") (citations omitted).
164. Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a
Unified First Amendment Exemptionsfrom Neutral Laws of General Applicability,
66 Mo. L. REv. 9, 28 (2001).

2013]

PHYSICIANS AND FIREARMS

31

demanding than strict scrutiny but more stringent than rational basis
review."l 65 Therefore, the Gentile balancing test approximates an
intermediate level of scrutiny.
2. Interests Asserted by Florida to Uphold the Law
In Wollschlaeger, Judge Cooke opted not to pick between strict
scrutiny and the Gentile balancing formula because, as noted earlier,
Florida "would not prevail under either test." 66 In reaching this
conclusion, she either rejected or devalued in serial fashion each of the
state's asserted interests underlying the Act.167
Before doing so, however, she emphasized a point that
apparently troubled her beyond the content-based nature of the Act itself.
Specifically, she pointed out that the Act bans "truthful, non-misleading
speech"' _a fact she characterized as "curious"l 69 because "[t]he
purpose of preventive medicine is to discuss with a patient topics that,
while perhaps not relevant to a patient's medical safety at the time,
informs the patient about general concerns that may arise in the
future."1 70 She intimated that such governmental paternalism in
preventing the public from evaluating for itself truthful, non-misleading
speech made her especially skeptical when evaluating Florida's alleged
interests.17 ' Florida asserted a quartet of interests: (1) protecting Second
Amendment rights; (2) preventing harassment and discrimination of
patients; (3) safeguarding patients' privacy; and (4) regulating the
medical profession.172
Initially, Judge Cooke rebuffed Florida's assertion that it has an
"interest in protecting its citizens' fundamental rights"' 73 to keep and
bear arms. She reasoned here that the "State's arguments rest on a
165. Id. at 24.
166. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2012).

167. See infra notes 172-201 and accompanying text.
168. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id.at 1263-64.
172. See infra notes 173-201 and accompanying text (examining Judge
Cooke's analysis of these four interests).
173. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1264.
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legislative illusion"' 7 4 because "[p]rotecting the right to keep and bear
arms is irrelevant to this law."' 5 That's because no portion of the statute
includes language that actually safeguards the ability of Floridians to
Put differently, Florida's
own, possess, or transport firearms.
enactment of a law that prevents doctors from posing gun ownership
queries does nothing to further protect the Second Amendment interests
of Floridians. Thus, as Judge Cooke wrote, Florida did not possess either
"a legitimate or compelling interest"177 on the Second Amendment issue.
The judge then turned her attention to a second, different interest
asserted by Florida-preventing doctors from discriminating against and
harassing patients based upon their gun ownership.
Judge Cooke,
however, explained that the Act did not truly protect gun-owning patients
from discrimination because physicians could still terminate patient
relationships for refusal to answer questions about firearm ownership.179
Furthermore, the judge's primary reasons for rejecting the
harassment/discrimination argument boiled down to both an abject lack
of evidence of such problems and the fact that any umbrage a patient
might, in fact, take at a firearm-ownership query does not alone justify
enactment of a speech-prohibiting statute. so As she put it, "[t]here is no
evidence that such alleged harassment and discrimination is widespread
or pervasive. A concern for some patients who may be offended or
uncomfortable by questions regarding firearm ownership is insufficient
to justify this law."' 8' The latter assertion, of course, comports with the
larger First Amendment principle that speech cannot be restricted by the
government simply because it may offend.182 Thus, just as she did with

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. Id
179. Id. at 1264-65.
180. Id.
181. Id at 1264 (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2669
(2011)).
182. As former Justice David Souter encapsulated it, "merely protecting
listeners from offense at the message is not a legitimate interest of the government."
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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Florida's Second Amendment interest, Judge Cooke concluded that
Florida's interest in preventing harassment and discrimination was
neither legitimate nor compelling. 183
Next, Judge Cooke addressed Florida's argument that "it has an
interest in protecting individuals' privacy rights related to firearm
ownership and possession."' 84 Although she noted that Florida "has a
legitimate interest, although perhaps not a compelling one, in protecting
patients' privacy regarding their firearm ownership or use,"
she
determined that Florida "fails to provide any evidence that the
confidentiality of this information is at risk."l 86 Once again, the lack of
supporting evidence doomed Florida's assertion of a compelling interest,
as the interest was devalued to the level of legitimacy.
Finally, turning to Florida's interest in regulating the medical
care profession, Judge Cooke rejected the idea that such an interest was
compelling, citing the plaintiffs' argument that the Act limits their
"ability to make inquiries of their patients to determine what issues are
relevant to their care and may require further consultation."
Judge
Cooke, however, tossed Florida a very small legal bone, opining that its
interest in regulating professions "may be a legitimate one."' 8 8
The bottom line was that Florida only had two legitimate
interests and not a single compelling one left standing after Judge
Cooke's analysis. The Act, in brief, could not pass muster under strict
scrutiny.189 Judge Cooke thus turned to balancing those two remaining
legitimate interests under Gentile against the First Amendment interests
of the plaintiffs. 190 As with her analysis of the quartet of interests set
forth above, it was largely a matter of lack of evidentiary support that
spelled defeat for Florida. 19 1 For instance, Judge Cooke noted that while
Florida "may have, in the abstract, a legitimate interest in protecting
183. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1264.
184. Id. at 1265.
185. Id.
186. Id. at n.5.
187. Id. at 1265.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting that strict scrutiny
requires the existence of a compelling interest).
190. Wollschlaeger,880 F. Supp. 2d at 1265-66.
191. See id. at 1266.
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patients' privacy regarding their firearm ownership or use," the Sunshine
State nonetheless "fails to provide any evidence that the confidentiality
92
of this information is at risk."'
Although acknowledging Florida possesses "a legitimate interest
in regulating the medical profession,"l93 she found this interest was
outweighed because the Act "does not impose a mere incidental burden
on speech. Rather, truthful, non-misleading speech is the direct target of
the Act." 9 4 The restriction of such speech, she reasoned, could directly
harm a patient, and the Act's good-faith relevance exception for allowing
firearms questions described earlier' 95 could not save it:
A physician may ask in an initial questionnaire
about lifestyle choices or high-risk activities even
though the physician does not, at that time, have a
goodfaith belief that the information is relevant to
that patient's medical care. The purpose of the
inquiry is so that the practitioner can determine
what subject matters require further follow-up in
the practice of preventive medicine. The
restrictions at issue here are especially problematic
because, as Plaintiffs note, there may be cases
where, unless the practitioner makes an initial
inquiry about firearms (albeit with no good faith
basis, at the time of the questioning, that it is
relevant), the patient may not know to raise the
issue herself and may not receive appropriate,
possibly life-saving, information about firearm

safety.196
Adding constitutional insult to Florida's already injured Act,
Judge Cooke went beyond this as-applied analysis to declare part of it
void for vagueness.
Specifically, and as previously described in Part
192. Id at 1266.
193. Id
194. Id at 1266-67.
195. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (quoting the statute).
196. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1267 (emphasis added).
197. Id at 1269; see generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108
(1972) (observing that "[iit is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is
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1,198 the Act allows a physician to ask about firearm ownership if she "in
good faith believes that this information is relevant to the patient's
medical care or safety, or the safety of others." 199 Focusing on the phrase
"relevant to the patient's medical care or safety," Judge Cooke opined
that:
[i]n the context of preventive medicine, which is a
forward-looking practice, it is unclear whether the
clause means "relevant at the time of the consult
with the patient" or "relevant at any time in the
future." The uncertainty regarding this standard is
especially problematic in this case, where it has a
chilling effect on speech, and, by extension, on the
effectiveness of the practice of preventive
200
medicine.
Ultimately, Judge Cooke permanently enjoined the speechrestrictive portions of the Act.2 0 1 The next section of this article examines
some of the arguments now being made by the parties and selected
friends of the court on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.
B. Overview ofArguments on Appeal to the Eleventh Circuit
In late 2012, briefs in Wollschlaeger were filed with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit by both parties and multiple
202
friends of the court. This section provides a brief synopsis of some of

void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined" such that they fail to
"give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited"); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES
910 (2d ed. 2002) (observing that "[a] law is unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable
person cannot tell what speech is prohibited and what is permitted. Unduly vague
laws violate due process whether or not speech is regulated").
198. See supra Part I.
199. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2) (2013).
200. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1268.
201. Id. at 1270.
202. Oral arguments occurred on July 18, 2013. ACLU on State Appeal of
Challenge to Law Banning Doctors from Asking About Guns: "Just Plain Dumb",
THE TALLAHASSEE 0 (July 22, 2013) http://tallahasseeo.com/2013/07/22/aclu-on-
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their key arguments, hitting the highlights rather than giving a detailed
critique.
1. Brief for Appellants203
Perhaps the most interesting argument on appeal made by the
State of Florida is that the Act's inclusion of both the hortatory word
"should"204 and the good-faith relevance exception 205-which provides
that "a health care practitioner or health care facility that in good faith
believes that this information is relevant to the patient's medical care or
safety, or the safety of others, may" 206 inquire about firearms
possession-guts the plaintiffs' entire assertion that their First
Amendment right to ask firearms-related questions is violated.
With a somewhat subtle dig at Judge Cooke, Florida contends
that the district "court did not mention that the text of the Act does not
really forbid doctors from asking patients about firearms - it says only
that they 'should refrain' from asking, except as is relevant to patient
'medical care or safety, or to the safety of others."' 20 7 The emphasis on
"really" appears in the original brief, which suggests that Florida's
opinion is that this is an important-even critical-point misunderstood
208
by or, more charitably, overlooked by Judge Cooke.
Indeed, this is the lynchpin of Florida's argument to the Eleventh
Circuit. As the state's brief later elaborates (emphasis once again in the
original):
Plaintiffs' case is built on a misinterpretation of the
Act. They alleged incorrectly, and the district court
wrongly accepted, that the Act on its face prohibits
physicians from asking and advising patients about
firearms safety. But the law does not prohibit the

state-appeal-of-challenge-to-law-banning-doctors-from-asking-about-guns-justplain-dumb.
203. Brief for Appellants, supra note 61.
204. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
206. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2) (2013) (emphasis added).
207. Brief for Appellants, supra note 61, at 9.
208. Id.
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speech that Plaintiffs allege is infringed, nor does it
violate free speech rights. The crux of Plaintiffs'
allegations is that they wish to ask patients if they
have guns and, if so, to discuss firearm safety. The
Act does not forbid this activity.209
Parsed differently and more bluntly, the plaintiffs simply don't
get it; they've got nothing to worry about due to the hortatory
phraseology and the good-faith relevance provision. As Florida asserts,
"the Act explicitly contradicts Plaintiffs' reading and a plain reading
avoids constitutional problems" 210 because the Act "does not gag or ban
doctors from asking or advising patients about firearms safety." 2 11
Florida's second significant argument-one also designed to cut
the plaintiffs' First Amendment case off early-is that "[t]he Act
regulates professional conduct, not speech."212 Expanding on this
argument, the brief filed by Attorney General Pamela Bondi on behalf of
Florida contends that:
any speech restriction is merely incidental to the
Act's regulation of conduct by health care
providers; specifically, the Act seeks respect for the
privacy and rights of gun owners and to prevent
discrimination and unnecessary harassment. The
district court did not appropriately distinguish
between professional conduct and speech in
construing the Act.213
A third facet of Florida's argument plays on the judicial
uncertainty described both in the Introduction and in Section A of this
part regarding the appropriate standard of judicial review for measuring
laws affecting doctors' speech. Specifically, Florida argues that if the
appellate court rejects its argument that the Act only incidentally burdens
speech, then the Eleventh Circuit should apply intermediate scrutiny
rather than strict scrutiny.214 Somewhat oddly-given that the Act is not
209. Id. at 11.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

12.
16.
13.
31.
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* 215

about advertising-the state cites
the intermediate scrutiny standard
from the commercial speech case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission216 as the correct rule here rather than
either the Gentile balancing formula described in Section A or the
intermediate scrutiny standard embraced by the high court for time,
217
place, and manner regulations.
Fourth, and finally, Florida argues that the Act is not unduly
vague.218 Given the state's heavy reliance on the good-faith relevance
exception for its assertion that the Act does not restrict physicians'
ability to pose questions about firearms,219 it is not surprising that a key
piece of its vagueness argument relates to that provision. Florida asserts
that:
"Relevant" denotes something that relates to an
issue. As used in the Act, the phrase "relevant to
the patient's medical care or safety" communicates
that providers should not interrogate the patients in
their office about firearms if it is unrelated to
medical or safety concerns. It contains no temporal
limitation. So the reader can also reasonably
conclude that a good faith inquiry can be made
with respect to either current or foreseeable

215. Id.

216. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). As the Court formulated that test:
For commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment],
it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
217. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything:
Intermediate Scrutiny in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 783,
788-91 (2007) (describing the intermediate scrutiny standard as used for time, place,
and manner regulations).
218. Brief for Appellants, supranote 61, at 37.
219. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
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medical- and safety-related concerns consistent
with medical standards.220
With this overview of Florida's appellate court arguments in
mind, the next section examines the plaintiffs-physicians' arguments to
the Eleventh Circuit.
2.

221

Brief for AppelleeS

In laying the factual predicate for their case for affirmance of
Judge Cooke's permanent injunction, the plaintiffs-appellees initially
222
223
assert both the customarinesS and the importance
of the firearmsrelated speech in which they wish to engage. They bolster their position
regarding the significance of that speech by noting that medical
organizations, including the American Academy of Pediatrics and the
American Academy of Family Physicians, "recommend counseling
families about firearm injury prevention."22 4
Turning to the terms of the Firearm Owners' Privacy Act, the
brief highlights the ambiguousness of the Act's good-faith relevance
exception.225 Specifically, the plaintiffs-appellees assert concerns about
the scope of the provision and write that they often ask "about firearms
as a routine matter of preventive medicine, even when they had no basis
to believe, in advance, that such an inquiry was relevant to the particular
patient beyond the general interest in gathering patient information and
providing appropriate safety counseling." 2 26 Put differently, they
frequently pose questions about firearms during the patient intake

220. Brief for Appellants, supra note 61, at 38 (citation omitted).
221. Brief for Appellees, supra note 130.
222. See id at 3 (asserting that "[i]nquiring about firearm ownership and
recording such information in a patient's medical record is a routine part of the
effective practice of preventive medicine for many health care practitioners")
(emphasis added).
223. See id. (asserting that "[t]he record in this case is replete with undisputed
evidence regarding the extent of firearms-related injuries and deaths in Florida,
including both empirical evidence and tragic stories of accidents involving
Appellees' patients and others").
224. Id.
225. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (addressing this provision).
226. Brief for Appellees, supra note 130, at 9.
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process without knowing whether those questions will later prove
relevant.
In addition, the plaintiffs-appellees assert vagueness issues
relating to both how and when "relevance" is to be determined under this
exception. Specifically, they argue the Act "does not specify whether
practitioners must make a particularized finding of relevance for each
patient asked about firearms, or whether they may rely on a general
belief that such inquiries are always relevant to patients' medical care
and safety." 227 In other words, is relevance to be determined on a patientby-patient basis or is it universally applicable across the patient
population?
Further attacking the good-faith relevance exception, the
plaintiffs-appellees argue that the very imposition of a government228
As they put it, "no
imposed "relevance" hurdle is unduly intrusive.
matter how capacious the statute's 'relevance' standard might be, the
State's prohibition against 'irrelevant' speech concerning gun safety still
unconstitutionally restricts Appellees' First Amendment rights. The State
cannot force practitioners to put their speech through a State-imposed
'relevance' filter before speaking with their patients." 2 2 9
Summarizing their overall argument-and highlighting the key
debate about whether strict scrutiny or a lesser standard should be
applied-the plaintiffs-appellees write:
The law applies only to health care practitioners . .
. not other topics of preventive medicine or any
other subject . . . .

Such speaker- and content-

based restrictions on speech are forbidden by the
First Amendment unless they can satisfy strict
scrutiny. The Firearm Owners' Privacy Act
indisputably cannot survive strict scrutiny; the
State does not even try to defend it under that
standard. Instead, the State seeks to avoid judicial
review altogether or to urge a lesser standard of
scrutiny. But those efforts fail, and the District

227. Id. at 54.
228. See id at 27.
229. Id
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Court's order enjoining enforcement of the
challenged provisions of the Act should be
affirmed.230
Among other points made in their Eleventh Circuit brief, the
plaintiffs-appellees argue:
231
* the Act regulates physicians' speech, not just their conduct;
232
* despite the Act's use of the word "should" described earlier,
the Act nonetheless is mandatory and not hortatory;233
* the Act negatively affects the rights of patients to receive
speech that they might want to hear;234
* key terms are unconstitutionally vague, including the standard
of relevance in the good-faith exception provision;235 and
* the Act not only restricts the right of physicians to speak, but
236
also the right of patients to receive speech.
With these summaries of the appellate court arguments of both
parties in mind, the article briefly addresses arguments made in key
amicus briefs.
3.

The NRA Comes to Florida's Defense

Given the framing of the case described in Part I as one pitting
Second Amendment rights against First Amendment interests, it is
anything but surprising that the NRA filed a friend-of-the-court brief on
Florida's behalf237 The heart of the NRA's argument buttresses Florida's
central assertion-namely, that the Act "simply recommends that
practitioners 'should refrain' from asking questions about firearms unless
related to medical care or safety. The statute at most thus imposes a
230. Id. at 13-14.
231. Id. at 15.

232. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
233. Brief for Appellees, supra note 130, at 14.
234. See id. at 16 (writing that "the Act prohibits practitioners from inquiring
of, or recording information about, firearm ownership even if the patient would
welcome the exchange and having that information in the patient's file. The State
cannot presume that all patients will find the speech unwelcome").
235. Id. at 17.
236. Id. at 29.
237. Brief of NRA, supra note 134.
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remote restriction on health care practitioners' speech."238 Physicians are,
under the NRA's construction of the Act, "free to exercise their good
faith medical judgment in discussing firearms safety with patients."239
The NRA argues that the Florida legislature's inclusion of the
word "should" in the sentence stating that doctors "shall respect a
patient's right to privacy and should refrain from making a written
inquiry or asking questions concerning the ownership of a firearm"240
makes the precatory nature of the statute clear.241 The NRA contends that
such statutory construction also allows the court to avoid the larger
constitutional issues, asserting that "even if the Act were ambiguous, a
hortatory reading of 'should refrain' - a reading to which the text is
readily susceptible - avoids any First Amendment issue." 24 2
Furthermore, the NRA asserts that the Act merely protects
patients from harassment and discrimination based upon their gun
243
ownership. As described earlier in this article,
the Act includes a
provision holding that doctors "shall respect a patient's legal right to own
or possess a firearm and should refrain from unnecessarily harassing a
patient about firearm ownership during an examination." 244 Another
provision provides that doctors "may not discriminate against a patient
based solely upon the patient's exercise of the constitutional right to own
and possess firearms or ammunition." 2 45 Playing on the framing of the
case as one pitting constitutional interests against each other, the NRA
asserts that "[t]he First Amendment does not give a physician the right to
discriminate against and/or harass a patient who chooses to exercise her
fundamental Second Amendment right [to] own a firearm, merely
because that discrimination or harassment may take the form of
speech."246 The NRA adds that "the Act facilitates the exercise of Second
Amendment rights by protecting citizens who choose to exercise those

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
Id. at 4.
FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2) (2013) (emphasis added).
Brief of NRA, supra note 134, at 5-8.
Id. at 8.
See supra notes 10 and 73 and accompanying text.
FLA. STAT. § 790.338(6) (2013).
FLA. STAT. § 790.338(5) (2013).
Brief of NRA, supra note 134, at 13.
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rights from discrimination and harassment in the provision of medical

care."247
4.

The ACLU and Health Care Organizations Weigh In

The ACLU Foundation of Florida filed an amicus brief that was
joined by multiple medical and healthcare organizations, such as the
Broward County Pediatric Society, the Palm Beach County Medical
248
Society, and the Florida Public Health Association. Raising both the
interests of doctors and patients, the brief asserts that the Act "patently
violates the First Amendment rights of both the doctors whom2 4it9 restrains
and of those patients who do not want their doctors muzzled.',
The heart of their argument is that by singling out health-care
practitioners for regulation-not all professions or occupations-and by
targeting a specific subject for regulation, the Act amounts to a:
[C]lassic content-based prior restraint of speech.
The licensed status of these specific citizens does
not provide any justification for the imposition of
the prior restraint at issue. Moreover, the supposed
privacy interests of the patients are not at all
protected by the statute; instead, they are a mere
pretext for the State's suppression of speech with
250
which it disagrees.
The ACLU brief emphasizes the point that in-take questionnaires
used by doctors often include many questions on a wide-range of topics,
not simply gun ownership. As they assert:
These questions are examples of where this statute
has a very real and immediate impact on a
substantial amount of speech by many healthcare
practitioners and providers. The statute subjects
practitioners to discipline if they continue to
engage in the use of their preliminary screening

247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 22.
ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 128.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
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questionnaires or if they follow up with further oral
questions on the same topic. 25'
With this overview of both Judge Cooke's 2012 ruling and the
arguments now being made on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit in mind,
the article next turns to the critical, unresolved question about the
standard of scrutiny that should be applied to analyze the Act. In an
effort to bridge theory with doctrine, Part III deploys traditional First
Amendment philosophies to argue that restrictions imposed on
physicians' right to ask questions of patients warrants the use of strict
scrutiny.
III. RECONCILING FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH RIGHTS
WITH FREE SPEECH THEORY IN THE CONTEXT OF
PHYSICIAN-POSED QUESTIONS TO PATIENTS

Federal courts have long recognized that the First Amendment
protects the ability of doctors to advise patients. "The right of the doctor
to advise his patients according to his best lights seems so obviously
within First Amendment rights as to need no extended discussion,"
252
observed Justice William 0. Douglas in 1961. Yet, a gray area remains
today regarding the standard by which courts should review the legality
of restrictions imposed on doctors' speech.
That gray area exists because the Supreme Court has failed to
extend the discussion about physicians' free speech rights in the
subsequent half-century since Douglas' remarks. The Court has offered
only cursory comments, such as those noted earlier in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,253 suggesting a reasonableness standard for the
254
regulation of physicians' speech.
More than forty years after Douglas' statement above, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit weighed in on the matter, opining
that "[a]n integral component of the practice of medicine is the
communication between a doctor and a patient. Physicians must be able
to speak frankly and openly to patients. That need has been recognized
251. Id. at 9.
252. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
253. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
254. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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by the courts through the application of the common law doctor-patient
privilege."255 Even then, the extent to which the First Amendment
256
protects physicians' speech remained unclear and unsettled.
This part of the article explores First Amendment theory-based
rationales for protecting Florida physicians' speech rights and their
patients' rights to receive speech, as well as why courts should uphold
those rights under the strictest possible standard of review. Initially, it is
necessary to note the constitutional questions left unresolved in Rust v.
Sullivan,2 57 and to discuss why the reasonableness standard in Casey
should not apply today in Wollschlaeger. A 1994 article by Professor
Paula Berg is one of the very few extended scholarly discussions delving
into such questions and doctor-patient speech within the larger context of
258
First Amendment theory.
Berg notes that cases dealing with "ideology-based restrictions
on doctor-patient speech have thus far been limited to discussions about
abortion and contraception."2 59 Rust and Casey, she points out, were two
of the first cases in which the Court "had to face the issue of whether
restrictions on the content of doctor-patient speech violate the First
Amendment." 260
In Rust, the Court considered the constitutionality of a regulation
prohibiting federal funds for programs that offered "counseling
concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning. 261In
response to challenges from physicians that the statute violated their First
Amendment rights, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, opined that the government was well within its rights to
prohibit such speech because "when the Government appropriates public
funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that

program."262
255. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 2002).
256. See Post, supra note 150, at 944 (arguing that the "relationship between
the First Amendment and the regulation of professional speech of doctors . . . is
unfortunately obscure and controversial").
257. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
258. Berg, supra note 37.
259. Id. at 202.
260. Id. at 204.
261. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989).
262. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194. Chief Justice Rehnquist added that:

46

FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW

rvol. 12

As Berg notes, "the Rust opinion left unclear whether the Court
would permit government to impose viewpoint-based regulations on
doctor-patient speech that occurred in private settings." 26 3 Unfortunately,
the Court also left unanswered whether "traditional relationships such as
that between doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First
Amendment from Government regulation, even when subsidized by the
Government."264 Chief Justice Rehnquist chose not to resolve this
question, arguing that the regulation did not "significantly impinge upon
the doctor-patient relationship" because a physician was not required "to
represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold."265 He
added that "[t]he doctor is always free to make clear that advice
regarding abortion is simply beyond the scope of the program." 26 6 One
year later, the Court offered a somewhat more nuanced outlook on the
First Amendment rights of physicians in Casey.
While the law at issue in Rust dealt with silencing physician
speech, in Casey the Court considered a Pennsylvania statute267 requiring
that "a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the
abortion procedure."2 68 In other words, the law compelled physicians to
inform patients about abortion-related health risks and to "tell patients

The Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without
at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so
doing, the Government has not discriminated on the
basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one
activity to the exclusion of the other.
Id. at 193.
263. Berg, supra note 37, at 211.
264. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
265. Id. at 200.
266. Id.
267. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (2012). The statute provides, in pertinent part,
that "[n]o abortion shall be performed or induced except with the voluntary and

informed consent of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed or
induced." Id.
268. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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about the availability of printed materials, which described the fetus and
listed agencies that offered alternatives to abortion." 2 69
A plurality of the Court upheld the speech-related provision,
despite acknowledging that "the physician's First Amendment rights not
to speak are implicated." 2 70 The plurality reasoned that the speech in
question was "part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State." 2 7 1 The plurality also qualified that
such regulations are constitutional as long as the compelled speech is
"truthful" or "nonmisleading." 272
Furthermore, and especially relevant for this article, Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined the plurality in upholding this provision, but
offered in a concurrence with what Professor Berg describes as a "due
process-based standard for assessing governmental regulation of the
content of doctor-patient discourse." 27 3 Under this standard, according to
Rehnquist, the government may regulate physician speech if the
regulation "is rationally related to the State's interest." 2 74 Thus, in this
landmark case, both the plurality opinion and the Chief Justice's
concurring opinion appear to. indicate that doctor-patient speech only
merits a reasonableness or rational-basis standard of review.
Rust and Casey provide the unstable foundation for the current
state of First Amendment protections for doctor-patient speech. There
are, however, several key differences between the contested laws in Rust
and Casey and the Firearms Owners' Privacy Act at issue in
Wollschlaeger. First, although the regulation in Rust sought to silence
physician speech, it only applied within the context of governmentfunded programs. Conversely, the Florida law applies to all physicians in
the state, regardless of whether they receive public funds.
Second, as discussed in the Introduction, some consider the
informed-consent requirement in Casey to constitute a form of conduct
275
rather than speech.
The Firearms Owners' Privacy Act, however,
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Berg, supra note 37, at 214.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
Id.
Id. at 882.
Berg, supra note 37, at 217.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 968 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
See Wells, supra note 47, at 1738.
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clearly prohibits pure speech, namely whether doctors can ask questions
and advise patients about firearm ownership and safety. The Act does not
regulate medical procedures, which might constitute conduct.
Finally, if the law in Casey is treated as regulating speech, it
does so by compelling physicians to speak. The Florida law, on the other
hand, prevents speech about firearms unless physicians, in good faith,
believe it is medically relevant. Specifically, by prohibiting inquiries
about firearms on in-take questionnaires, the law prevents speech as pure
and simple as posing a question-a question that can later be used to
help doctors fully inform patients about their health and safety.
While the 1994 article by Professor Berg broke ground in
applying First Amendment theory to doctor-patient speech, her
discussion remains confined to the context of patient rights in the Rust
and Casey decisions. Specifically, she uses First Amendment theory to
critique those decisions and to argue for the protection of a patient's right
to receive medical information, rather than the right of doctors to speak
and give medical advice. She contends that:
the Court [in Rust and Casey] did not recognize
that the principal constitutional threat posed by
government restrictions on the content of doctorpatient speech is not their infringement on
physicians' speech rights. Rather, the more serious
peril of such measures is that they enable
government to impose its orthodoxy on medical
decision making by limiting and biasing the
medical information available to patients.276
These limitations, Berg argues, threaten a patient's ability to
discover the truth277 and to obtain self-fulfillment278 based on two of the
prominent traditional First Amendment theories.
Unlike Berg's work, this article uses First Amendment theories
to argue for the constitutionally protected rights of patients to receive
information and for the free speech rights of doctors to dispense it.279 To

276. Berg, supra note 37, at 206.
277. Id. at 235.

278. Id. at 238.
279. See supra notes 10-12.
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do so, this part applies the three traditional First Amendment theories
pertaining to: (1) democratic self-governance; (2) human dignity, selffulfillment and individual autonomy; and (3) the attainment of truth
through unfettered discussion in the marketplace of ideas. This part
concludes by discussing how these theories necessitate the use of strict
scrutiny standard in the review of Florida's Firearms Owners' Privacy
Act.
A. DemocraticSelf-Government
Few discussions, today, are as fraught with politics as those
280
Philosopher and educator Alexander
involving gun legislation.
Meiklejohn long ago recognized the need to protect speech related to
political issues and matters of public concern.281 As Professor Pierre J.
Schlag put it, Meiklejohn believed that "in a democratic society selfgovernment is an important value and that political or public speech is
essential to self-government."282 For Meiklejohn, the First Amendment
acted not as a means to protect speech in and of itself, but it served the
"positive enterprise of cultivating the general intelligence upon which the
success of self-government so obviously depends." 28 3 In his 1948 book
on the subject, Meiklejohn narrowly confined First Amendment
protections to that speech which serves self-government. Nothing
illustrates this point better than when Meiklejohn declared:
The guarantee given by the First Amendment is
not, then, assured to all speaking. It is assured only
to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon
issues with which the voters have to deal - only,
therefore, to the consideration of matters of public

280. See David Sherfinski, Senate Panel Approves First Post-Newtown Gun
available at
Control Bill, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2013, at Al,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/7/new-gun-buying-restrictionspass-senate-panel/?page=all.
281. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948).
282. Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on CategoricalApproaches to Freedom of
Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 707 (1983).
283. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 281, at 17.

50

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

interest. Private speech, or private interests in
speech, on the other hand, has no claim whatever to
284
the protection of the First Amendment.
As Schlag points out, this assertion leaves us with a vague
definition of political speech.285 Nonetheless, Meiklejohn believed
speech regarding political issues merited the utmost protection because
the ultimate goal of free speech is "the voting of wise decisions." 28 6
If one takes Meiklejohn's original theoretical framework at face
value, speech about firearm ownership and safety constitute political or
public speech. After all, firearm safety is a matter of public concern, and
given the current climate surrounding guns, gun ownership, and adopting
new laws to limit gun possession, one cannot deny the political
287
implications of such discussions.
Furthermore, even if doctors
somehow collude to ask questions about firearms for political reasons,
such as to spread some sort of anti-gun message to their patients, then
physicians clearly are engaging in speech that indirectly attempts to
influence a public issue. Therefore, the democratic self-governance
theory would likely place the doctors' speech at the highest level of First
Amendment protection.
However, Meiklejohn's original assertion about the importance
of political speech drew criticism from many First Amendment scholars.
In a 1949 review of Meiklejohn's book, Zechariah Chafee claims that
Meiklejohn overlooked important First Amendment protections for other
non-political forms of speech such as "science, art, drama, and
,,281
poetry.
Chafee believed that the framers of the Constitution surely
had these other forms of speech in mind when drafting the First
Amendment. More recently, Rodney Smolla observes that the framers
"were renaissance minds, engaged by science, art, literature, philosophy,
morality, religion, architecture, horticulture, law, business, and

284. Id. at 94.

285. Schlag, supra note 282, at 708.
286. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 281, at 25.
287. See Sherfinski, supra note 280, at Al.
288. Zechariah Chafee, Book Reviews, 62 HARV. L. REv. 891, 897 (1949)
(reviewing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948)).
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politics."289 Smolla critiques Meiklejohn's original claim that all ideas
rather than all speakers should be protected, arguing that "the state lacks
the moral entitlement to presume to dictate what is 'worth saying' and
when 'everything worth saying' has been said."2 90
In 1961, in response to critics, Meiklejohn adapted his theory on
the self-government functions of the First Amendment, adding that
"there are many forms of thought and expression within the range of
human communications from which the voter derives the knowledge,
intelligence, sensitivity to human values: [sic] the capacity for sane and
objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should express."291
He argued that speech relating to education, "[t]he achievements of
philosophy and the sciences," "[1]iterature and the arts," and "[p]ublic
discussion of public issues, together with the spreading of information
and opinion bearing on those issues" would also fall under the scope of
292
First Amendment protection.
Other scholars have discussed the importance of the selfgovernance theory, with emphasis on Meiklejohn's revised interpretation
that included other, non-political forms of expression. Notably, Thomas
Emerson observed that "freedom of expression is essential to provide for
participation in decision making by all members of society." 29 3 For
Emerson, free expression not only covers political matters but also
"embraces the right to participate in the building of the whole culture,
and includes freedom of expression in religion, literature, art, science,
and all areas of human learning and knowledge."294
Florida and its supporters take a large leap in spreading the
notion that doctors are deliberately attacking the Second Amendment
rights of patients by asking questions about firearms. As lead plaintiffphysician Bernd Wollschlaeger noted, questions about firearms are
295
simply a form of preventative medicine, especially for doctors whose
289. RODNEY A.
290. Id. at 16.

SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH INAN OPEN SOCIETY 14 (1993).

291. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP.
CT. REV. 245, 256 (1961).

292. Id. at 257.
293. THOMAS L. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7
(1970).
294. Id.

295. Brief for Appellees, supra note 130, at 3.
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patients are children. Regardless of the political controversy surrounding
gun laws such as the Florida Firearm Owners' Privacy Act, the ability of
doctors to pose questions about, and advise patients regarding, guns
deserves free speech protections under the democratic self-governance
theory.
To enhance what Meiklejohn calls "the range of human
communication from which the voter derives"296 the ability to make
informed decisions, doctors must be able to consult with patients about
firearm safety, and alert them to any health and safety risks. For
example, doctors might provide patients with advice on securing guns
and that guidance, in turn, could translate to a patient voting for a sheriff,
district attorney or legislator who advocates for legislation that keeps
guns out criminals' hands. That seems to be a very real possibility given
that thieves stole an average of more than 230,000 guns per year "during
burglaries and other property crimes in the six-year period from 2005
through292010."297
Many stolen guns, in turn, end up playing a role in
8

crimes.

Meanwhile, guns are a leading killer of children in United
States.299 A thirty-year snapshot of child-gun death and injury data
reveals that firearms killed more than 116,000 minors between 1979 and
2009.300 So, doctor-patient conversations regarding guns can potentially
save lives, but that is not the only reason that the constitutional rights of

doctors to speak (and patients to listen) should be protected. The
democratic self-governance theory protects doctor-patient conversations

296. Meiklejohn, supra note 291, at 256.
297. See LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, CRIME DATA BRIEF: FIREARMS STOLEN DURING HOUSEHOLD
BURGLARIES AND OTHER PROPERTY CRIMES 2005-2010 1 (2012), available at

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fshbopc051O.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2013)
(detailing federal data regarding stolen firearms).
298. See CTR. FOR GUN POLICY AND RESEARCH, BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB.
HEALTH, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., FACT SHEET: STOLEN GUNS 1 (2003), available at
http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gunpolicy-and-research/publications/guns theft fs.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
299. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, PROTECT CHILDREN, NOT GUNS 2 (2012)
available at http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data
/protect-children-not-guns-2012.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
300. Id. at 4.
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regarding guns because the dissemination of knowledge about the risks
and safety measures associated with firearms can help citizens make
better informed decisions at the ballot box regarding the candidates and
gun-related initiatives about which they vote.
B. Human Dignity, Self-Fulfillment & Individual Autonomy
Nothing describes the relationship between the practice of
medicine and the respect for human dignity better than the Hippocratic
Oath under which a "physician's duty [is] not merely to make his or her
own judgments, but also, to make those judgments for the sole purpose
of benefiting his or her patient." 3 0 1 The Hippocratic Oath, which is
administered to medical students upon graduation from medical school,
includes two key themes: "the promises of acting in the best interest of
the patient and of confidentiality."302 Indeed, in one translation of the
original oath, physicians promise, "according to [their] ability and
judgment," to "keep [their patient] from harm and injustice." 30 3
In a profession so concerned with protecting the dignity and
autonomy of patients, 3 04 it would be hard to argue that the First
Amendment theories of human dignity, individual autonomy and selffulfillment do not apply in the context of doctor-patient discourse.
Indeed, a rich body of literature exists regarding the relationship
between First Amendment protections for free expression and one's
sense of dignity, autonomy, and self-fulfillment.3 0 s As Emerson puts it,
"[t]he proper end of man is the realization of his character and
potentialities as a human being. For the achievement of this selfrealization the mind must be free." 306 Furthermore, restrictions on speech
violate man's human dignity and "elevate society and the state to a
despotic command over him and [places] him under the arbitrary control

301. Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44
ARiz. L. REV. 313, 314 (2002).
302. Howard Markel, "I Swear by Apollo" On Taking the Hippocratic Oath,
350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2026, 2028 (2004).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See generally EMERSON, supra note 293.
306. Id at 6.
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of others.,,30 Given the close relationship between thought and speech,
Smolla argues that censorship often violates a person's dignity and
autonomy as an independent, reasoning being.308
At the same time, First Amendment theories involving human
dignity and self-fulfillment offer protection to both doctors and patients
when they converse. Protecting doctor-patient discourse reinforces the
human dignity of patients to sort through the information they receive
from doctors, so patients can feel a sense of fulfillment as they make
informed decisions about health and well- being. Simply put, the free
speech interests of doctor-patient discourse apply equally to the right of
patients to receive medical information and to independently evaluate it
for themselves.
Professor Berg reinforces these points in her article on
physician-patient speech and First Amendment theory. She stresses that
"[d]octor-patient speech is essential to maintaining patients' autonomy,
self-determination, and dignity in the face of illness." 30 9 Berg explains
that "[i]nformation is a patient's only shield against fear and uncertainty,
which can reduce even powerful, educated, and self-assertive individuals
to quaking passivity. Through candid discussions with their physicians,
patients are able to retain autonomy and control over their lives and their
bodies.,3' 0 For the sake of a patient's dignity as a human being and his or
her individual autonomy, Berg believes doctor-patient speech should be
awarded the utmost of First Amendment protections.
The operative question, however, remains: does this theory still
relate to the issue at the centerpiece of this article because the speech at
stake - questions about firearms - is not necessarily medical in nature?
Furthermore, one might still question whether the ability of doctors to
ask patients if they own firearms is really related to the human dignity
and self-fulfillment of patients.
Dissenting in Rust, Justice Henry Blackmun, along with
Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens, aptly points out that, beyond
medical treatment, a patient also "seeks a physician's aid . . .

307. Id.
308.

SMOLLA, supra note 289, at 10-11.
309. Berg, supra note 37, at 237 (footnote omitted).
310. Id. at 237-38 (footnote omitted).

for
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guidance, professional judgment, and vital emotional support.
As
for
highly
seek
physicians'
advice
Berg puts it, "patients commonly
personal, nonmedical problems. When it works, the outcome of this
discourse is a mutually determined treatment decision that reflects the
best judgment of the doctor and patient about how to proceed." 3 12
Yet, in Wollschlaeger, Judge Cooke points out in her permanent
injunction of the Firearms Owners' Privacy Act, the prohibition on
asking questions about firearms in the Florida law prevents patients from
receiving helpful safety information about which they might otherwise
313
not have asked3. Furthermore, the Act goes so far as to silence
discussion about firearms for patients who actively want to hear relevant
safety information. 3 14 Thus, the Florida law violates patients' individual
autonomy and prevents the self-fulfillment that comes when individuals
make health and wellness decisions based on their right to be informed or
advised by their physicians.
Of course, some patients may not want to hear firearm safety
information. The Florida law was spurred by anecdotal information about
supposed episodes of harassment and discrimination against firearm
owners visiting doctors' offices across the Sunshine State.3 15 The late
First Amendment theorist C. Edwin Baker contended that paternalistic
regulations that shield people from speech they may otherwise not want
to hear nonetheless violate the listener's dignity and integrity.316 In order
to protect the listener's autonomy and dignity, Baker argued, individuals

311. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 218 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
312. Berg, supra note 37, at 237 (footnote omitted).
313. See Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1265-66 (S.D. Fla.
2012).
314. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 130, at 16 (writing that "[T]he Act
prohibits practitioners from inquiring of, or recording information about, firearm
ownership even if the patient would welcome the exchange and having that
information in the patient's file. The State cannot presume that all patients will find
the speech unwelcome.").
315. See supra Part I (providing background on the legislative history of the
Act).
316. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH (1989).
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should be treated "as agents who can either reject or accept views that
they hear."3 17
Especially relevant to the context of this discussion, Baker
stressed that a law attempting to ban or regulate speech "to protect
people from harms that result because the listener adopts certain
perceptions or attitudes disrespects the responsibility and freedom of the
listener."m In short, individuals should possess the autonomy to make up
their own minds about the speech they hear and the information they
receive; any paternalistic attempt to protect listeners from hearing such
speech disrespects a listener's dignity as a rational human being.
Regardless of whether patients want to learn about firearms safety, First
Amendment theories related to human dignity, individual autonomy, and
self-fulfillment still protect this speech.
Furthermore, the First Amendment also should protect physician
speech because doctors themselves deserve the human dignity and selffulfillment that flows from free expression. Whether doctors are
performing medical procedures or engaging in discourse regarding the
best means for a patient's health and safety, they are fulfilling their
Hippocratic responsibility in preventing "harm and injustice."319 Surely,
one can't deny that physicians may also experience a sense of dignity
and self-fulfillment by carrying on the doctor-patient discourse and
helping others. According to Smolla, humans "possess certain
entitlements to dignity and autonomy by sheer virtue of their
humanity."320 Doctors, therefore, should not be forced by the state to
relinquish these entitlements when they enter a hospital or medical
facility.
Of course, as discussed earlier in the context of Casey, the Court
has ruled that the medical profession is "subject to reasonable licensing
and regulation." 3 2 1 On the other hand, as some scholars have noted,
Casey treated the informed-consent requirement as a regulation of
322
medical conduct rather than speech. Indeed, as Emerson notes, "the
317. Id. at 59.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. at 56.
See Markel, supranote 302, at 2028 (stating the Hippocratic Oath).
SMOLLA, supra note 289, at 11.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
See, e.g., Wells, supra note 47, at 1738.
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state is entitled to exercise control over action - whether by prohibiting
or compelling it."32 3 The Florida law does not regulate, compel or
otherwise prohibit conduct; instead, it centers on expression, namely
speech in the form of a question. Speech, according to Emerson,
"occupies an especially protected position" 32 4 as "the fountainhead of all
expression of the individual personality." 3 25 Furthermore, speech
warrants more protection because it "is normally conceived as doing less
injury to other social goals than action."326
Even in the context of the physician-patient relationship, it
would be a stretch to assert that asking questions rises to the level of
conduct rather than expression. Unlike the abortion-related cases in
which statutes compelled or silenced speech directly related to a medical
procedure, the questions asked about firearms only lead to more
speech-specifically, advice about firearm safety. Viewed in this light,
the First Amendment theories of human dignity, autonomy and selffulfillment also protect physician speech and the right to pose questions.
For Baker, respect for human dignity and autonomy entails
providing people with the ability "to use their bodies and minds to
develop and express themselves."327 Thus, all people have "an equal right
to try to influence the nature of their collective worlds." 3 28 Furthermore,
this First Amendment theory implies that every individual "has the right
to use speech .

. .

to influence or interact with others in a manner that

corresponds to her values."329 As noted earlier, the American Academy
of Pediatrics, in representing the values of pediatricians, strongly urge all
physicians who deal with the health care of children to ask parents about
firearm ownership and advise them about firearm safety.330 Thus, when
physicians give this advice, they are attempting to influence others about
their values relating to firearm safety.

323. EMERSON, supra 293, at 8-9.

324. Id. at 8.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 9.
Id.
BAKER, supra note 316, at 59.
Id.
Id.
American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 17, at 1421.
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Yet, Florida severely limits doctors' ability to influence the
world around them and to provide patients with the tools and knowledge
for their own safety. Physicians who fear punishment for asking
questions about particular topics cannot fully perform their duties to the
best of their abilities. Although they may operate in a heavily regulated
industry, physicians still deserve the feeling of dignity and autonomy that
comes with the ability to express one's thoughts about issues of health
and safety and, indeed with the case of guns, life and death. Without
protecting frank and open discussion by physicians about these issues,
the Act prevents physicians from feeling a sense of self-fulfillment at the
end of the day from knowing they offered potentially life-saving advice
about firearms safety to their patients.
C Attainment of Truth through the MarketplaceofIdeas
What is a visit to the doctor other than a patient's attempt to find
answers to questions relating to her health and wellbeing? In other
words, interactions with physicians facilitate patients' searches for the
truth about themselves - their health, their illnesses, their conditions.
Freedom of speech as a means to attain the truth is part of a strong
tradition in First Amendment theory. As Emerson maintains, a person
"who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all sides of the question,
consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposition,
and make full use of different minds."331
John Stuart Mill championed this notion in his classic tome, On
332
Liberty. For Mill, open discussion was the only way one could obtain
the truth. "[O]nly through diversity of opinion," Mill wrote, "is there, in
the existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of
the truth." 3 33 In his analysis of On Liberty, K.C. O'Rourke succinctly
describes Mill's central thesis: "The ultimate origin of truth . . . is part of

the insight of the individual intellect. Discussion serves to bring these
insights before the public mind. And this is a further reason why each

331. EMERSON, supra note 293, at 6-7.
332. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1974) (1859).
333. Id. at 111.
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person should be free to express opinions on all subjects." 3 34 The idea
that free speech and open discussion will allow individuals to obtain a
better understanding of the truth serves as the basis for many First
Amendment protections.
Indeed, the relationship between free speech and the attainment
of truth has now commonly been associated with the marketplace of
ideas theory. As early as 1919, when the Supreme Court decided Abrams
v. United States,m Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' dissenting opinion
stated "that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market." 33 6 Although it lay quietly in
Holmes' dissent at the time, as legal scholar Sean Michael McGuire
recently observed, the marketplace theory serves as "the dominant
metaphor used in First Amendment jurisprudence."337 Given the
relationship between the practice of medicine and the search for truth, it
follows that the marketplace of ideas would justify First Amendment
protections for doctor-patient discourse, at least to some extent.
As Professor Berg aptly puts it, "a primary goal of doctor-patient
discourse is to discover the 'patient's truth'-the best course of medical
treatment in light of that patient's unique configuration of objective and
subjective characteristics." 338 In the context of the Florida law, doctorpatient discourse would lead to the best way to keep children safe from
firearm-related incidents. Furthermore, restrictions on physician speech,
Berg argues, hinder "the discovery of truth by preventing patients from
learning about options that they otherwise might have chosen." 339 Many
parents might be unaware of the dangers of firearms to children in the
home. As Dan Baum recently observed in a Wall Street Journal article,

334. K.C. O'ROURKE, JOHN STUART MILL AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: THE
GENESIS OF A THEORY 90 (2001).
335. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
336. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
337. Sean Michael McGuire, Media Influence and the Modern American
Democracy: Why the FirstAmendment Compels Regulation of Media Ownership, 4
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 689, 693 (2006).
338. Berg, supra note 37, at 235.
339. Id. at 247.
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"[a]ccidental child death is one of the few gun statistics that has grown
worse since 1999.",340
Furthermore, the give and take of the marketplace facilitates
discovery of truth for both doctors and patients. Berg contends that
"conversations with numerous patients over time enhance doctors'
scientific and medical knowledge about diseases, medications,
procedures, symptomology, diagnoses, and the practice of medicine in
general." 3 4 ' For that matter, doctor-patient dialogues about guns might
lead parents to learn about new ways to safely store guns or keep them
from children. Without the ability for doctors to ask questions and offer
advice about firearm safety, both the doctor and the patient miss out on
the opportunity to discover truths and expand their knowledge about
health and safety.
D. Why FirstAmendment Theory Requires the Application ofStrict
Scrutiny to Test the Validity of the FirearmsOwners'PrivacyAct
The discussion above demonstrates how key First Amendment
theories support the constitutional protection of a physician's right to ask
a patient whether he or she owns firearms. However, in order for a theory
to extend legal and constitutional protections for speech, courts must
bridge the gap between First Amendment theory and doctrine. Professor
Post, in his discussion of the link between theory and doctrine, writes
that "the purpose of doctrine is to institutionalize constitutional
objectives."342 But while Post argues that the Court's reliance on multiple
theories creates doctrinal conflicts, Rodney Smolla believes that "[t]here
is no logical reason . .. why the preferred position of freedom of speech
might not be buttressed by multiple rationales." 34 3 And that has been the
approach of this part of the article. Throughout, it has used a mix of First
Amendment theories and a defense of the varied, respective interests of
patients and doctors when it comes to defending their constitutionally
protected right to discuss guns.
340. Dan Baum, Review - A Gun Lover on Why Our Gun Debate is Off Target,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2013, at Cl.

341. Berg, supra note 37, at 236.
342. Post, supra note 33, at 160.
343. SMOLLA, supra note 289, at 5.
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When it comes to protecting speech, the strict scrutiny standard
of review places a high hurdle before a government attempting to create
restrictions. Specifically, "the burden of proof," as Professor Catherine
Fisk explains, "is on the government to prove: (a) a compelling interest
in regulating the speech, and (b) that all less restrictive alternatives 'will
be ineffective to achieve its goals."' 34 4 As mentioned earlier, courts
typically apply this standard when dealing with content-based
restrictions.34 5 Judge Cooke argued in her permanent injunction that the
Florida law did, indeed, constitute a content-based restriction by
specifically prohibiting speech related to firearms. 34 6
Given the nature of doctor-patient speech in the context of this
case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals now should apply the highest
standard of review possible to the Florida law. Speech among doctors
and patients regarding firearm safety serves vital functions in a selfgoverning society. Protecting such doctor-patient speech leads to:
informed decision-making about crucial public issues; protection of
patients' rights to receive information and advice about their health and
safety; respect of patients' dignity and their self-fulfillment as humans
when they can make decisions based on what they hear and learn; and
the ability of doctors to fully perform their Hippocratic duties by
advising parents about the best means to protect themselves and their
loved ones from harm.
Finally, protecting this type of doctor-patient speech dignifies
and fulfills physicians because they can exchange ideas and discuss
safety information that potentially promote the wellbeing of their patients
and lead to the discovery of shared truths with those they serve. Simply
put, free speech is the very foundation of effective doctor-patient
exchanges, and any law violating their First Amendment rights should be
subjected to and rejected by the strictest standards of judicial scrutiny.
While Judge Cooke equivocated in her 2012 Wollschlaeger opinion
about the proper standard of review, the Eleventh Circuit now should
adopt strict scrutiny.

344. Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 57, 90 (2002).
345. See supra note 41 and accompanying text
346. See supra note 146-148 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Amber Ullman likely didn't intend to instigate a constitutional
conflict when she declined to answer a pediatrician's gun-ownership
questions in July 2010. Regardless, her rebuffment of the doctor led, in
no small part, to an ongoing federal-court battle ostensibly pitting the
First and Second Amendments against each other.
This Article has argued, however, that Florida's Firearm
Owners' Privacy Act in no way enhances, let alone protects, the right to
bear arms. Instead, the Act creates a content-based speech regulation that
abridges the right of doctors to practice potentially life-saving preventive
medicine by counseling patients about gun safety.
At the same time, the Act deprives patients who might want to
discuss firearm safety of that opportunity-the right to receive speechbecause it is predicated on the notion that doctors should default to
silence on the topic. Florida, however, contends the Act is merely
hortatory and allows physicians to discuss guns with their patients if the
subject meets an ambiguous standard of good-faith relevance. Cynically
viewed, Florida jettisoned a politically verboten topic from doctorpatient discourse.
Despite such problems, the Florida law now provides a
propitious opportunity for the Eleventh Circuit to resolve a question the
U.S. Supreme Court has left unsettled: What standardof scrutiny should
be applied to measure the constitutional validity of statutes restricting
the speech of physicians within the context of doctor-patient
relationships? Contradictory judicial decisions and conflicting theories
complicate a defense of professional/physician speech under the strict
scrutiny standard, especially given that the Supreme Court has suggested,
at least in the context of abortion-related cases, that intermediate scrutiny
is appropriate.
Using several key First Amendment theories of free speech, this
Article contends that the Eleventh Circuit should adopt strict scrutiny.
The dispute in Wollschlaeger involves pure speech, not a medical
procedure or drug. prescription. The Eleventh Circuit, of course, could
dodge the entire First Amendment issue by holding that the Act is merely
hortatory and/or that it regulates only medical conduct, not speech.
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The Eleventh Circuit's forthcoming ruling, although only
binding on the states within the circuit, likely will influence lawmakers
in other gun-friendly states. While Florida is the only state thus far to
adopt a statute regulating physicians' gun-ownership discussions with
patients, "[s]ix other states - Alabama, Minnesota, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Tennessee and West Virginia - have considered similar
legislation in recent years." 34 7
Significantly, in early 2013 lawmakers in both Kansas348 and
Missouri349 proposed bills affecting information about patients' gun
ownership that doctors can record in medical records. Ironically, the
Florida legislature in 2013 considered a measure to repeal the speechrelated provisions of the Firearm Owners' Privacy Act-even as the state
appeals to the Eleventh Circuit to salvage the statute. 350
Threats to physicians' speech regarding firearms also exist at the
federal level. To the surprise of the Obama administration,5 a section of
the controversial Affordable Care Act restricts the ability of doctors to
pose gun-related questions of patients.352 The provision went largely

347. Michelle Andrews, Medical Questions About Gun Ownership Come
Under
Scrutiny,
KAISER
HEALTH
NEWS
(Nov.
26,
2012),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Features/Insuring-Your-Health/2012/112712Michelle-Andrews-on-gun-ownership.aspx.
348. Andy Marso, Committee Passes Gun Bill Without Doctor Provision,
TOPEKA CAPITAL-J., Feb. 27, 2013, available on NewsBank database.
349. See Elizabeth Crisp, Statehouse Buzz: Gun Proposals Spur Interest in
Missouri Legislature, ST.
Louis
POST-DISPATCH
(Feb.
15,
2013),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/elizabeth-crisp/gun-proposalsspur-interest-in-missouri-legislature/article_5d04e3c8-5d2d-58c 1-8d8 17a781c23cacl.html.
350. See H.B. 4017, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), available at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?Billld=49495&.
(proposing to repeal provisions relating to medical privacy concerning firearms and
prohibited acts by health care practitioners, health care facilities and insurers related
to the collection and use of information about patients' ownership of firearms but
failing in committee).
351. Peter Wallsten & Tom Hamburger, In Health-Care Law, A Victory for
NRA, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2012, at Al.
352. Read the Law at 2037-39, Affordable Care Act: The Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be
codified as amended in scattered sections of21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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unnoticed until the December 2012 shooting in Newtown, Conn. 35 3
Following a strong appeal against the provision 35 4 by medical and legal
organizations,3 55 President Obama signed a January 2013 executive
action declaring that no part of the health care reform law should be
interpreted as forbidding doctors from discussing guns with patients.356
It is time for courts such as the Eleventh Circuit in
Wollschlaeger to finally resolve that any restriction on physician speech
not related to a medical procedure must be measured against the strict
scrutiny standard of review. Both the right to speak and the right to
receive speech lie in the balance, as do the health and safety of patients.

353. Wallsten & Hamburger, supra note 351, at Al.
354. Id.
355. Letter from American Academy of Pediatrics et al. to Rebecca
Zimmerman, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (Dec. 27, 2012), available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2012 /12/30
/National- Politics/Graphics/Obamacareletter.pdf.
356. See WHITE HOUSE, Now IS THE TIME: THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN TO PROTECT
OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COMMUNITIES BY REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE 9 (2013)
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh now is the
time_full.pdf ( "The Administration will issue guidance clarifying that the
Affordable Care Act does not prohibit or otherwise regulate communication between
doctors and patients, including about firearms.").

